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Abstract:  
 
Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently 
steered the financial services industry to collateral loan obligations (CLOs) as an important 
balance sheet management tool. CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed 
Securitisation (ABS), with investors acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds 
generated from a portfolio of bank loans in the form of tranches with different seniority. By 
way of modelling Merton-type risk-neutral asset returns of contingent claims on a multi-asset 
portfolio of corporate loans in a CLO transaction, we analyse the optimal design of loan 
securitisation from the perspective of credit risk in potential collateral default. We propose a 
pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss based on parametric 
bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). The analysis illustrates the dichotomous 
effect of loss cascading, as the most junior tranche of CLO transactions exhibits a distinctly 
different default tolerance compared to the remaining tranches. By solving the puzzling 
question of properly pricing the risk premium for expected credit loss, we explain the 
rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the basis of our simulation results for 
pricing purposes under the impact of asymmetric information. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the recent past loan securitisation has proven its value as an efficient funding and capital 
management mechanism for financial institutions. As a structure of credit risk transfer (and 
loan sale) it could lead to a mitigation of required minimum capital when regulatory levels are 
proven to be overly conservative. By subjecting bank assets to market scrutiny loan 
securitisation facilitates prudent risk management and diversification as an effective method of 
redistributing credit risks to investors and broader capital markets through issued debt 
securities (MORRIS AND SHIN, 2001). Thus, loan securitisation is an expedient asset funding 
option in comparison with other means available to banks, since issuers are able to achieve a 
more precise matching of the duration of their managed assets and liabilities. However, the 
flexibility of issuers and sponsors to devise a particular transaction structure, i.e. choosing 
from a vast variety of methods to subdivide and redirect cash flows from an illiquid underlying 
reference portfolio, also bears the risk of severe misalignments of information between issuers 
and investors as to the term structure of default probability and loss severity of loan default.
1 
 
Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently stirred 
the financial services industry to advanced activism in loan securitisation. During the last years 
the securitisation of corporate and sovereign loans has attracted an increased following from 
both banks and financial service companies in order to obtain capital relief and gain liquidity 
or to exploit regulatory capital arbitrage opportunities. In the wake of increasing popularity of 
securitisation for reasons mainly to be found in regulatory and economic arbitrage, collateral 
loan obligations (CLOs) have evolved into an important balance sheet management tool. 
CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), with investors 
acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds generated from a portfolio of bank loans 
in return for a certain degree of collateral default they are willing to accept. Both interest 
spread and default losses are prioritised on the basis of contractual repartitioning according to 
investor seniority. Due to the inherently diverse and intransparent nature of bank loan 
portfolios the presence of asymmetric information imposes some sort of “lemon’s problem” á 
                                                 
1  SKORA (1998) defines credit risk as the risk of loss on a financial or non-financial  contract due to the 
counterparty’s failure to perform on that contract. Credit risk breaks down into default risk and recovery risk. 
Whereas default risk denotes the possibility that a counterparty will fail to meet its obligation, recovery risk is the 
possibility that the recovery value of the defaulted contract may be less than its promised   
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la AKERLOF (1970) on the economic workings of this securitisation process. Despite efficiency 
losses due to adverse selection and moral hazard, issuers of CLO transactions achieve gains 
from bundling assets and then further tranching them before they are sold into the capital 
markets. The dissemination of losses on theory of an agreed prioritisation warrants particular 
attention in determining the state-contingent pay-offs of investors in such a case of 
asymmetric information, since broad risk categories of structured transactions depend on the 
quality distribution of the collateral pool. 
 
The varying willingness of sponsors and issuers to securitise only part of selected loan 
portfolios has drawn increased attention to credit enhancement as a frequently observed 
feature of CLO securitisation. Banks commonly retain an equity claim on a portion of the 
collateral portfolio to provide capital cover for first losses by buying back the most junior 
securities issued by the conduit. Alternatively, such credit enhancement could also take the 
form of a standby letter of credit to the conduit, or by the sponsoring bank. In return for 
providing such credit enhancement, as well as the loan origination and servicing functions, the 
sponsoring bank lays claim to the residual spread between the yields on the underlying loans 
and the interest and non-interest cost of the conduit, net of any losses on pool assets covered 
by the credit enhancement. Capital market investors hold the remaining tranches of the 
securitisation transaction. This typical structure of a CLO transaction is subjected to a 
prioritisation of both default losses and interest income generated from the underlying 
collateral portfolio, which indicates the investment risk investors are willing to tolerate in the 
light of adverse asymmetric information about asset quality  of the collateral. Credit 
enhancement represents an attempt of stymieing adverse selection to ensure incentive 
compatibility of issuers with investor expectations in a CLO transaction.
2 However, the 
concentration of all first losses in an equity tranche retained by the sponsor does result in a 
default rate different from the investors’ default tolerance exhibited in the expected spreads on 
more senior mezzanine tranches. The security design of CLOs has it, the extent to which 
pricing of CLO transactions and the willingness of the issuer/sponsor to resort to asset 
retention mirrors the economic rationale of loan securitisation under information asymmetry. 
The modelling of the peculiar characteristic of default risk emanating from underlying loan 
collateral is critical in loan securitisation in the light of the high-yield structured finance market 
                                                 
2 See also CALVO (1998) for a detailed discussion of the “lemons problem” in the context of financial contagion.  
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having witnesses distressed performance and inevitable adverse follow-on effects on the 
performing of loans in the underlying asset collateral over the recent past. 
 
The manifestation of persistent downward rating drift have sparked interest in a diligent 
surveillance of asset performance. Especially the term structure of defaults in the underlying 
asset portfolio of securitisations has inadvertently drawn attention to the issue of credit 
enhancement whose assessment of covering first loss severity is coupled with the ability of the 
issuer to avert unexpected levels of substandard asset performance. Banks have identified 
particularly CLOs in curbing fears of rising levels of loan delinquencies jeopardising the rating 
levels of such transactions. In keeping with prudent collateral surveillance, this would 
eventuate a more careful contemplation of defaults (i.e. delinquencies and termination rates) 
of corporate loans as growing numbers of banks seriously considers securitisation as an 
expedient means of balance sheet restructuring through active credit portfolio management to 
the detriment of more agile interest-based bank business.  
 
1.1  Objective 
 
The following paper purports to a comprehensive examination of default risk and its 
ramifications on the security design of CLOs under symmetric information only, as the degree 
of transparency about the collateral pool quality does not have any bearing on the workings of 
the securitisation structure once it has been put in place. The paper aims at modelling the 
valuation of senioritised contingent claims on multi-asset reference portfolios underlying 
collateralised loan obligations (CLOs).  
 
1.2  Method 
 
In the course of proper asset pricing of structured finance transaction with a defined credit 
event, such as loan securitisation, extreme events enter very naturally, and as such, 
understanding the mechanism of loss allocation and the security design provisions governing 
them becomes essential. In absence of historical credit default data, we propose a Merton-
based (1974) credit risk pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss 
based on parametric bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). Given the number 
of stochastic variables and the complexity of the relationships no closed form solution for 
calculating the needed risk measures is available. Thus, the analysis is undertaken with a Monte  
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Carlo simulation model. In this way we simulate and measure credit risk, i.e. collateral default 
losses, of a loan portfolio for the issuing process of securitisation transactions under 
symmetric information.  
 
The loss distribution function stems from portfolio-level statistics derived from deterministic 
assumptions about asset-specific properties as to the contribution of expected/unexpected 
credit loss by individual loans (see Figure 1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative distribution function of credit portfolio losses. 
 
The allocation of periodic losses in proportion to the various constituent tranches, their 
evolution over time and their bearing on the pricing of the CLO tranches for risk-neutral 
investors and in comparison to zero-coupon bonds will be the focus of this examination. 
Hence, the suggested model serves as a blueprint for the adequate valuation of CLO 
transactions, if we render the value of contingent claims dependent on the totality of expected 
periodic credit loss of a multi-asset portfolio allocated to the tranches issued. The resulting 
tranche spreads are indicative of the default pattern of CLOs, which causes excess investor 
return expectations in view of information asymmetries. By assuming a uniform portfolio and 
a corresponding distributional approximation of stochastic loan losses (without taking into 
consideration prepayments and early amortisation triggers most common to CLOs), the 
analysis illustrates the dichotomous effect of loss cascading as the most junior tranche of CLO 
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transactions exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance compared to the remaining 
tranches. Finally, we explain the rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the 
basis of our simulation results for pricing purposes. As an extension to this paper, we propose 
to test the viability of the model by comparing simulated credit risk to historical probabilities 
of portfolio credit default, aside from the presented comparison of simulated risk-neutral 
returns on tranches and analytical bond prices.
3 
 
1.3  Scope of Research 
 
We synthesise three major areas of research. Both professional and academic accounts appear 
with respect to (i) pricing credit risky instruments, credit risk measurement of portfolios, credit 
risk management (see CAOUETTE, ALTMANN AND NARAYANAN (1998) for an overview), (ii) 
contract theory, security design and asset liquidity  (CLEMENZ, 1987; B OLTON AND 
SCHARFSTEIN, 1990; RAJAN, 1992; DEMARZO AND DUFFIE, 1997; HOLMSTRÖM AND TIROLE, 
1998; BHASIN AND CAREY, 1999; PARK, 2000; WOLFE, 2000), (iii) financial intermediation and 
underwriting  (DIAMOND,  1991;  GORTON AND  PENNACCHI, 1995;  GANDE, P URI,  AND 
SAUNDERS, 1999; DIAMOND AND RAJAN, 2000; and (iv) market structure and competition 
(KYLE, 1985; GLOSTE AND MILGROM, 1985; OLDFIELD, 2000) and (v) and loan securitisation 
(RIDDIOUGH, 1997; DUFFIE  AND  ˆ GARLEANU, 2001 and 1999; D UFFIE AND SINGLETON, 
1998  and  1999).  We follow the current literature in the combining credit risk and loan 
securitisation at portfolio level, as we model the asset returns of senioritised contingent claims 
on a multi-asset reference pool of loans in a CLO transaction. In order to value such claims 
we develop a variety of portfolio risk models to calculate the probability distribution potential 
credit losses for the guarantor’s reference portfolio over a certain period of time. We consider 
systematic risk impacting on aggregate (uniform) portfolio default at a constant between-asset 
correlation, with individual risk being diversified in a pool of a sufficiently large number of 
independent risks. The parameters of simulated periodic default losses of the reference 
portfolio are translated into an economically meaningful concept, as we estimate the periodic 
loss severity for the CLO reference portfolio, which has a bearing on the pricing of the CLO 
tranches. We calculate the risk-free returns of CLO securities for both fixed and variable 
interest rates, required by investors to be sufficiently compensated for expected credit risk of 
the reference portfolio under the impression of a particular security design, i.e. the allocation 
                                                 
3 See also BARNHILL AND MAXWELL (2002).  
  7 
 
of default losses and their term structure. Adverse selection and moral hazard certainly are 
cardinal parameters in this regard.  
 
With respect to the security design of CLOs three important factors enter this paper as 
important considerations. First, what are the loss sharing effects of the extent to which banks 
are willing to bear part of the losses stemming from the non-performance of the reference 
portfolio in expedient of partial retention of a part of the portfolio? As issuers pass on 
remaining asset claims to capital market investors, any credit enhancement establishes a 
particular degree of “collateralisation” of the securitisation transaction with corresponding 
changes to the expectation of possible losses to be borne by outstanding debt securities issued 
on the loan portfolio. Second, the assumed structure of these outstanding debt securities has 
to be in compliance with the current security design in the securitisation market of corporate 
loans, i.e. the model assumptions about the specificities of the CLO tranches match the 
empirical observations of standard ranking of asset claims in CLO transactions. Third, the 
market value of the securitised collateral portfolio is subjected to gradual erosion through loan 
default (excluding effects of amortisation through prepayment). Default loss is accounted for 
only at the end of a single period  t , such that the reference portfolio is assumed to be 1 at 
time t .  
 
The objective of illustrating the default term structure and pricing of CLO tranches based on a 
loss cascading model breaks down in four distinct sections. First, we project the estimated 
default expectations of holders of tranches in the securitisation transaction by simulating the 
expected and unexpected losses on a loan portfolio with standard assumptions as to the 
portfolio risk parameters. Since we are at a loss of sufficient historic data about loan defaults 
extreme value theory will be employed to determine proxies of default loss on a loan portfolio 
with a constant, increasing and decreasing forward rate of default probability. Subsequently, 
we derive approximate credit ratings for the CLO tranches by means of benchmarking the 
term structure of default rates of expected losses with expedient zero-coupon bonds as upper 
und lower bounds, before the risk-neutral spreads on the various tranches of a CLO 
transaction are calculated from cumulative default loss per tranche. Finally, the obtained 
results are contemplated in a post-simulation assessment of the incentive of both 
issuers/sponsors of the transaction and investors to acquire certain tranches on the theory of  
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remedying information asymmetries. These findings have important implications for portfolio 
models to explain the implications of credit risk on structured finance. 
 
 
2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Our approach follows the present credit risk literature in the valuation of contingent claims 
and the analysis of loan default as to the  issuer’s ability and incentive to meet payment 
obligations in terms of credit risk cover for expected losses. This area of asset pricing sits well 
with prominent structural models of credit risk ( MERTON, 1974; BLACK AND COX, 1976; 
BRENNAN AND SCHWARZ, 1978; LELAND, 1994 and 1998). We also resort to WALL AND 
FUNG (1987), IBEN AND BROTHERON-RATCLIFFE (1994) and DUFFEE (1996), who discuss 
credit risk as it applies to portfolio risk management. We offer an original contribution to this 
field of research as we focus on extending traditional models of valuing multiple underlying 
assets in the context of security design of loan securitisation and the impact of maturity on 
asset valuation ( LELAND AND  TOFT, 1996). Despite the abundance of structural models, 
pricing methodologies of the CLO mechanism are still found wanting (FIDLER AND BOLAND, 
2002), leave alone multi-asset approaches to reliably represent the cost and risk associated with 
the partial asset retention as credit enhancement as a vital requisite of CLO transactions. One 
of the main reasons for a lack of appropriate asset pricing techniques is that the valuation of 
multi-asset contingent claims defies a closed-form solution. We address this issue by 
modifying the multi-asset process of credit losses of loan reference portfolios by means of 
extreme value theory (EVT) simulation in order to bootstrap parameters estimates for the 
determination of credit loss as a basis for the valuation of claims. 
 
The reason for EVT as a methodology is straightforward. In the course of proper asset pricing 
of structured finance transaction with a defined credit event, such as loan securitisation, 
extreme events enter very naturally, and as such, understanding the mechanism of loss 
allocation and the security design provisions governing them becomes essential. In absence of 
historical credit default data, the set-up of this CLO pricing model makes an explicit analytic 
formulae in the spirit of a closed form solution to give way to careful simulation, i.e. a 
sufficiently iterative process of deterministic credit default in order to generate extreme events 
of portfolio distress ( ASMUSSEN, 1999). In advent of imminent regulatory change ( BASEL  
  9 
 
COMMITTEE, 1999a) this aspect should prove to be particularly instrumental in resolving the 
puzzling pricing mechanism underpinning CLO spreads. We believe that our novel approach 
of asset-pricing CLO tranches is not limited to robust valuation of CLOs. It also complements 
a variety of valuation models, based on multiple underlying uncertainties stemming from time-
varying contractual contingencies of asset origination and financial intermediation. 
 
One major strand of research explores the interdependence of the asset structure of the firm 
and the organisational form that supports the separation between the firm’s assets as a crucial 
underpinning of securitisation.  GREENBAUM  AND  THAKOR (1987) analysed the adverse 
selection effects of asset structure of financial institutions. According to their study private 
information held about the quality of originated assets would induce financial institutions to 
prefer the securitisation of better quality assets, whilst worse quality assets are retained on the 
books and funded by deposits. Generally such selective bias would lead financial institutions 
to champion securitisation transaction with high-risk reference portfolios in spite of increased 
bankruptcy risk. Hence, GREENBAUM AND THAKOR (1987) demonstrate not only how the 
between perceived quality of the asset structure comes to matter, but also assess the extent to 
which certain credit risk management techniques, such as asset securitisation could prove to 
be a suitable for transforming asset structures. 
 
Moreover, the complexity of securitisation transactions has led researches beyond the confines 
of scrutinising incentive problems in the association with the asset structure of financial 
institutions. There exists distinct set of literature that deals with the valuation of asset-backed 
securities. The common framework of existing models is aligned with the following 
assumptions. For one, a pool of assets is compiled, which underlies a senioritised collection of 
different classes of asset-backed securities. Upon simulation of individual asset performance, 
expected cash flows are aggregated, supporting the coupon and principal payments of the 
issued obligations. In most cases financial securities generating regular income or other 
financial commitments (e.g. loans, credit allowances, etc.) sustain these proceeds from the 
reference portfolio, which serves as collateral for the asset-backed securities. Ultimately, the 
pricing of the various classes (so-called “tranches”) of asset-backed securities is contingent 
upon prepayments and expected asset default of the underlying collateral portfolio, which 
impair the allocation of earmarked asset returns. The following studies are representative of 
the current state of research in the asset pricing asset-backed securities.  
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CHILDS, O TT AND  RIDDIOUGH (1996) employ a structural model for pricing commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) through Monte Carlo simulation based on the correlation 
structure of individual mortgages in the reference pool. They aggregate the value of each 
mortgage in order to determine the available amount of asset proceeds supporting each class 
of CMBS securities. Their proposed valuation methodology courts an optimal design of asset-
backed securities and forms an integral part of the established security design literature. 
RIDDIOUGH (1997) also theoretically solidifies this claim by modelling asymmetric asset value 
information and non-verifiability of liquidation motives in the context for purposes of optimal 
security design for asset-backed securities. In the bid for justifying issuers’ benefits associated 
with splitting off a completely risk-free security from the proceeds of the reference portfolio, 
he plausibly proves the compelling rationale of the so-called first loss provision as credit risk 
protection (credit enhancement). By retaining the most junior claim on cash flows from the 
reference portfolio, issuers internalise some or the entire agency cost of asymmetric 
information, the most critical impediment to fair asset pricing of securitisation transactions. 
RIDDIOUGH (1997) argues in this context that a junior claim seizes a vital function in the 
security governance of asset-backed securities due to better asset value information and its 
role as first loss position. Empirical implications of junior security holders controlling the debt 
negotiation process with pooled debt structures suggest the validity of this bid for an efficient 
design of asset-backed securities. 
 
DUFFIE AND  ˆ GARLEANU (2001) follow this common thread of research in their reduced-
form credit risk model of asset pricing collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). In line with the 
diversity score approach devised by rating agencies they calculate the default intensity 
processes for single debt obligations, which, by definition, are limited to either bonds or loans. 
In extension to this estimation of individual asset exposure, they obtain the aggregate default 
intensity of the entire reference portfolio in a similar analytic form. Consequently, the 
disposable proceeds from the reference portfolio enter an efficient pricing simulation of 
different security classes (tranches) of a CDO transaction under different priority schemes. 
 
In contrast to DUFFIE AND  ˆ GARLEANU (2001) our study focuses on the default intensities 
of the  entire reference portfolio in order to derive efficient pricing of collateralised loan  
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obligations (CLOs), albeit we consider individual asset correlation of loans underlying the 
translation. In quantifying the default probability and loss severity associated with the cash 
flow stream from the reference pool for a constant interest rate, we draw on JARROW, AND 
TURNBULL (1995), who take as given the term structure of credit spreads, i.e. a sufficient 
number of corporate bond prices, and derive an arbitrage free pseudo-probability of default, 
as well as JARROW, LANDO AND TURNBULL (1997), who introduce a Markov model for the 
term structure of credit risk spreads, where rating agencies’ default rates and bond prices serve 
as input, so that investors’ risk premium can explicitly estimated for static and variable risk-
free interest rates. Additionally, we rely on the breadth of other research in this so-called “yield 
spread approach” by LITTERMAN AND IBEN (1991), DAS AND TUFANO (1996), ARVANTIS, 
GREGORY AND  LAUREN (1999),  ARTZNER AND  DELBAEN (1994),  NIELSEN AND  RONN 
(1996), and DUFFEE (1996).  
 
We extend the pricing of CLO tranches pursuant to similar considerations suggested by DAS 
AND TUFANO (1996), who price credit-sensitive debt on the basis of stochastic interest rates, 
credit ratings and credit spreads, as well as RAMASWAMY AND SUNDARESAN (1986). Hence, we 
extend  JARROW AND  TURNBULL  (1995) in the spirit of  MADAN AND  UNAL (1998), who 
augment the JARROW AND TURNBULL approach by modelling equity depending probability of 
default and non-constant recovery rate at default.  The so-called “adjusted short rate 
approach” of credit spread modelling proffered by DUFFIE AND SINGLETON (1999), BIELECKI 
AND RUTKOWSKI (2000), PUGACHEVSKY (1999), BALLAND AND HUGHSTON (2000) comes 
into play, when we benchmark estimated tranche spreads with defaultable bond yields. 
 
As a more precise formulation for the credit risk involved in the reference pool is sure to 
produce an improved and more reliable asset pricing technique for asset-backed securities in 
general and CLOs in particular, our model primarily focuses on the valuation of CLOs. It also 
gives testimony of a plausible rationale as to why financial institutions securitise assets by 
providing credit enhancement in the form of first loss coverage. None of the existing models 
has been able to explicate this issue by means of an inductive approach on the basis of 
simulated default intensity processes.  
 
Many models assume asymmetric information akin to the “lemons problem” presented by 
AKERLOF (1970) and explain the gains to be realised by bundling assets and re-packaging them  
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in different tranches prior to issuance in the form of structured finance securities (DEMARZO 
AND  DUFFIE, 1997;  RIDDIOUGH, 1997). Generally, the separation of loans from capital 
requirements levied on the loan book institutions is achieved by means of actual or synthetic 
asset transfer to non-recourse single-asset entities. Such securitisation conduits, so-called 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs), are best understood as trust-like structures,
4 which issues two 
classes of securities upon asset transfer from the sponsor of the securitisation transaction, i.e. 
the loan-originating financial institutions. Whilst the holders of debt-like notes establish prior 
claim to the underlying reference portfolio of loans in order of agreed seniority, the issuer 
retains a residual equity-like class as first loss position. The ratio of debt-like notes and residual 
equity is commonly referred to as “leverage”, whose variation allows the issuing securitisation 
conduit to maximise its value for a given set of parameters. Depending on perceived average 
loan quality in the portfolio, the residual cash flow rights of equity holders act as limited 
liability for trust claimholders against costly bankruptcy ( FROST, 1997) as much as they 
guarantee senior claimholders a remote probability of suffering losses on their investment. 
Consequently, the restricted role of equity due to the absence of control rights does, however, 
upholds bankruptcy protection of senior claimholders, as it serves as an early amortisation 
trigger for inexpensive prepayment of liquidation value of a deteriorating reference portfolio. 
 
RIDDIOUGH (1997) explains that subordinated security design dominates whole loan sale, 
since cash flow splitting allows issuers to internalise some or all of the adverse selection risk, 
which would otherwise apply if they were to consider alternative options of “liquidating” a 
given pool of assets. Security design meets this objective, however, only if subordination levels 
increase relative to full information levels in order to limit agency cost for uninformed outside 
investors. Hence, the combination of early amortisation triggers and credit risk coverage, 
contractually anchored in CLO security design, also help to limit a likely predisposition of loan 
securitisation to m ispricing due to private information. Packaging strategies, such as pool 
diversification and loan bundling, add to this rationale, as they soften the asymmetric 
information dilemma the subordination effect is meant to guard issuers against, and thus, 
increase “liquidation proceeds” of the reference portfolio (RIDDIOUGH, 1997).  
 
                                                 
4 We assume the securitisation vehicle is registered under the statues governing corporations, and, therefore, pays 
taxes. However, these taxes are offset by tax credits of debt. Since we do not intend to unveil specific tax  
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While the appropriation of economic rents from information advantage about asset quality 
does admittedly come into play as an implicit incentive for the tranching of CLOs in 
association with the level of credit enhancement, our model concentrates on the optimal 
pricing of CLOs. Asset pricing loan securitisation could be approached either from the 
perspective of cash flows generated from the reference portfolio or the expected losses from 
creditor default. Most models in the literature concentrate on the upside of loan securitisation, 
i.e. the amount of distributable interest and principal proceeds to be had from the loan pool. 
We use a slightly different structure in our model.  
 
We analyse the optimal design of loan securitisation transactions from the perspective of 
credit risk and frictions related to potential default by modelling the loss side through extreme 
value simulation. By extending concepts and meanings of accepted principles of asset pricing 
under symmetric information to an asymmetric information context in the risk-neutral 
valuation of CLOs, expected losses translate into investment risk premium, which entails a 
certain term structure of credit spreads for the various tranches of a securitisation transaction. 
In that way, the risk premium commanded by issuers could be compared to empirically 
observed spreads in loan securitisation, such that CLOs could be accurately priced for the 
issuing process in a symmetric information setting. Consequently, the suggested model is also 
a viable alternative asset pricing technique for portfolio credit risk, since its simulation 
framework rules out stochastic shortcomings frequently encountered in loss distributions of 
future credit loss on the basis of observed rating transition. 
 
Although we suggest a general approach of pricing contingent claims in the area of portfolio 
credit risk management, we incorporate considerations, which have emerged in discussions of 
credit risk modelling in COSSIN (1997), MADAN (1998), MADAM AND UNAL (1994), and DAS 
(1998). For further information in context of gauging the impact of credit risk on structured 
finance instruments, we refer readers to HULL AND WHITE (1995) and COOPER AND MARTIN 
(1995), who make several important observations about credit risk and how it affects the price 
                                                                                                                                                    
advantages of loan securitisation (SULLIVAN, 1998), we consider the tax expense to have the same structure as in 
the case of the originating company.  
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of over-the-counter derivatives. Moreover, our analysis makes liberal use of bibliography of 
key texts presented at the end of this paper.
5  
 
 
3  LOSS DISTRIBUTION OF A UNIFORM COLLATERAL 
PORTFOLIO 
 
 
Past attempts to simulate credit risk of standard bank loan portfolios has been largely based 
on the notion that the probability of default of a uniform portfolio is consistent with a normal 
inverse distribution as the number of loans grows to infinity. According to VASICEK (1987), 
FINGER  (1999) and  OVERBECK AND  WAGNER (2001) the normal inverse distribution 
( ) r , NIDp  with default probability p>0 as mean and equal pairwise asset correlation r<1 for 
a portfolio of  h loans  with equal exposure  1 h for  ﬁ+¥ h , the cumulative distribution 
function with p  
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normally distributed asset returns. Its density is represented by  
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with standard deviation of the standard normal distribution function N derived from the 
bivariate normal distribution  ) ; , ( 2 r y x N  with a zero expectation vector,
6 such that  
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5 With respect to credit risk hedging, readers might find it worthwhile to consider SORENSEN AND BOLLIER 
(1994) for a practical explanation of pricing the credit risk in an over-the-counter swap. 
6 The bivariate normal distribution has a symmetric covariance matrix displaying the correlation factor r off and 
covariances on the diagonal.  
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4  TIME SLICING  
 
 
Assuming a discrete time grid  - <<<<< 011 ... jnn ttttt  to be applied in modelling the 
development of portfolio losses, which are only accounted for at the end of each time period 
j, the accumulation of absolute estimated losses  % L  over the time horizon n can be quantified 
as  
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with  r ~(,,) jjj XNIDxp  for  =1,..., jn , where  Xj  denotes the relative portfolio loss (in 
relation to the remaining exposure) at time period  j  on the basis of the normal inverse 
distribution defined by the portfolio parameters pj, rj indexed to the time increment j=1,…, n, 
given uniformity of the collateral portfolio and the residues after losses. The estimates losses 
according to extreme value theory are treated analogously. The collateral balance is assumed to 
be 1 at time j=0. Once the absolute losses are determined based on the random draft of 
uniform losses per period as the interim result, aggregating estimated periodic portfolio 
valuations translates into the generation of absolute losses. This approach is pursuant to the 
determination of the conditional default rate (“CDR”) used by commercial banks in the 
calculation of loss scenarios on reference portfolios. Periodic default loss is derived by means 
of combining a constant default rate with projected loan claims loss severity assumptions, i.e. a 
loss severity percentage that is incurred with respect to aggregate outstanding principal balance 
of the loan claims at the time of default is multiplied with a certain probability of default 
(which is reflected by a certain credit risk loss function in this analysis). 
 
Even though the respective density function fr (,,) xp  could be calculated by product folding, 
OVERBECK AND WAGNER (2001) state that a closed form display of the results does not seem 
to be possible and warrants numerical computation. Thus, in absence of reliable historical data 
pertinent on credit losses, the random variables Xj are generated on the basis of Monte Carlo 
simulation of a normal inverse distribution of credit losses according to the equation 0.1 
above. This approach requires the computation of uniformly distributed random variables 
Z~U(0, 1) and their subsequent transformation to periodic losses for each time step j with  
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by choosing the parameters of the loss function such that the first two moments match the 
ones obtained from the normal inverse distribution.  
 
Since the occurrence of extreme events takes a pivotal role in risk management considerations 
as to the accurate approximation of the credit portfolio losses, we need to extend this 
approach to take account of the extreme tail behaviour of credit events. Hence, the same 
methodology of generating random variables Xj in equation 0.5 is analogously applied to a 
Pareto-like distribution of credit losses, which reads in its general form as follows 
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This distribution of collateral losses according to an extreme value distribution as a 
transformed version of equation 0.6 will be presented as an improvement to the normal 
inverse distribution of credit losses based on the transformation of uniformly distributed 
random variables. 
 
 
5  LOSS CASCADING 
 
 
The prioritisation of asset claims in the structure of collateralised loan obligations results in 
portfolio losses  % L  being allocated successively to the constituent m tranches according to 
their level of seniority, i.e. all investors in tranche k have to bear the aggregate losses up to 
ak% of the outstanding notational value of the transaction, investors in the more senior 
tranche k+1 hold for the remaining losses but smaller than ak+1%. Thus, if one tranche k has 
been fully exhausted in terms of  estimated losses as reflected in default tolerance of the 
structured rating further losses in excess of the scheduled amount for the respective tranche 
(denoted by the interval aa - - 1 kk of default losses the tranche k covers) are allocated to the  
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subsequent, more senior tranche. This bottom-up cascading process perpetuates until all 
losses are allotted to the relevant tranches in the order of the scheduled default loss for each 
tranche, i.e. the proportional share aa - - 1 kk  in total periodic loss on the collateral portfolio, 
with  aaaa - £<<< 011 0... mm set as the boundaries of the respective tranches. These 
boundaries are time-invariant and lack the notation  j for time period. The mathematical 
notation for this allocative routine
7 applies to default losses in the following form 
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where  j L   represents the periodic default loss in time step j as the proportional default loss of 
the collateral portfolio is borne by tranche k. The determination of the expected credit loss 
per tranche in time period j and on aggregate over the entire maturity n,  
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yields a probability measures  %k
j L  and  %k L of the loss distribution f(xj) and f(x) over one time 
period j or on an aggregate basis respectively. The issuing entity tends to retain the lowest, 
most junior tranche (commonly an equity note) with a credit loss tolerance of aa - 01 , which 
absorbs the first loss exposure of the transaction, and, thus, is called the “first loss position” 
or “first loss piece”. This form of credit enhancement displays the extent to which banks are 
willing to bear part of the losses stemming from the non-performance of the reference 
portfolio. Such an asset retention establishes the degree of “collateralisation” of the 
securitisation transaction as issuers pass on asset claims to market investors by means of a 
special purpose vehicle. The prioritisation of structured claims reduces the default tolerance of 
the successive tranches, albeit increased interest rate sensitivity, which will be discussed later in 
this paper. The mezzanine tranches with low and medium investment grade rating are usually 
sold to capital market investors as notes and commercial paper (in the case of highly rated 
senior notes). Finally, the most senior tranches are securitised in the form of a credit default 
                                                 
7 See OVERBECK AND WAGNER (2001) for an abridged representation of this method of loss cascading.  
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swap with a equally or lower risk-weighted counterparty by means of a credit default swap or 
some other method of structural provision, such as a bilateral credit guarantee, etc.  
 
 
6  EXTREME VALUE THEORY AS LOSS FUNCTION 
 
 
Alternatively to the normal inverse distribution of random variables on a uniform space, one 
might resort to extreme value theory to model the loss density function of credit portfolios. We 
derive a loss function as a specialised form of a Pareto-like distribution (Fig. A12), which is 
one-dimensional by definition. Neither the generalised Pareto distribution (GPD) nor the 
transformed GDP presented in this model are derived from a multi-dimensional distribution 
with dependent tail events ( EMBRECHTS, 2000;  EMBRECHTS, M CNEIL AND  STRAUMANN, 
1999), even though we value contingent claims on a multi-asset portfolio of securitisable loans 
affected by default losses. This methodology is justified on the grounds of the stochastic 
characteristics of the reference portfolio. Since the loan pool exhibits equal between-asset 
correlation, we can do without multi-dimensional distributions by considering the reference 
portfolio to be one asset, whose credit risk is modelled on aggregate.  
 
Extreme value theory (EVT) propagates a stochastic methodology as part and parcel of a 
comprehensive risk measure to monitor asset exposure to extremes of random phenomena. 
EMBRECHTS (2000) describes it as a “canonical theory for the (limit) distribution of normalised 
maxima of independent, identically distributed random variables”, where solving for the right 
limit results of the equation  (0.9) below yields the estimation of the extremal events 
(EMBRECHTS,  KLÜPPELBERG  AND  MIKOSCH, 1997;  EMBRECHTS,  RESNICK  AND 
SAMORODNITSKY, 1999; MCNEIL, 1999), 
 
  ( ) = 1 max,..., nn MXX   (0.9) 
 
This is in stark opposition to the theory of averages, where 
 
  1 ... nn SXX =++   (0.10) 
 
describes the general notion o f quantiles as multiples of standard deviations, with the 
Brownian motion as a basic assumption representing what is known to be the most familiar  
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consideration of modelling diffusion processes. Multivariate EVT as an advanced form of 
estimating the extreme events in a random setting (EMBRECHTS, HAAN and HUANG, 1999), 
purports to translating the behaviour of such rare events into stochastic processes, evolving 
dynamically in time and space, by considering issues such as the shape of the distribution 
density function (skewness and kurtosis) and its variability in stress scenarios. However, the 
detachment of EVT from the straightjacket of hitherto distributional assumptions on 
dependent tail behaviour of stochastic processes does come at a certain cost.  The 
methodological elegance of estimating extreme events, be it normalised maxima of i.i.d. events 
or the behaviour thereof in the context of a stochastic process, admit to restrictions to an 
unreserved and unqualified adoption in credit risk management.  For o ne, EVT features 
substantial intrinsic model risk (EMBRECHTS, 2000), for its requires mathematical assumptions 
about the tail model, whose estimation beyond or at the limit of available data defies reliable 
verification in practice. The absence of an optimal canonical choice of the threshold above 
which data is to be used imposes deliberate exogeneity on EVT modelling, which could 
compound limitations of the model in the presence of non-linearities (RESNIK, 1998). While 
these qualifications could possibly upset some of the virtues of EVT, a common caveat to 
EVT, nonetheless, does not hold for the presented model. High dimensional portfolios will 
not impair the assessment of stochastic properties of extreme events (EMBRECHTS, HAAN 
AND HUANG, 1999), since we model rare events of default risk in a uniform credit portfolio as 
a proxy for the valuation of contingent claims on defaultable multi-asset portfolios. 
 
In a nutshell, the use of EVT as a methodology comes to matter as it best describes the 
stochastic behaviour of extreme events at the cost of strong distributional assumptions, for 
loss of less presumptive models with equal predictive power. In the context of loan 
securitisation the modelling of senioritised payout to investors from an underlying reference 
portfolio of loans over a given period of time, cases of portfolio distress do constitute extreme 
events in the sense of EVT. Given the objective of the proposed model to explain the effects 
of loss allocation and the security design provisions governing c ontingent claims under 
extreme events, EVT claims methodological attractiveness due to ease of application and 
flexibility in model calibration. Nevertheless, it certainly falls short of representing the ultimate 
panacea of risk management due to a multitude of unresolved theoretical issues, such as 
multiple risk factors and possible computational instability as ML estimated parameters do not 
necessarily converge (EMBRECHTS, 2000).   
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In defiance of the standard assumption of an elliptic distribution  
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since a heavy upper tail of periodic credit losses  j x  yields for some positive integer a  
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the generalised Pareto distribution (GPD) with parameters xb ˛> R,0  is defined by 
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where  ‡ 0 x  for x ‡ 0  and 
b
x
££- 0 x  for x < 0 . x  is a shape parameter of the distribution 
responsible for the tail behaviour, where the two cases x ‡ 0  and x < 0  yield heavy tails and 
light tails respectively. 
 
In order to construct a loss distribution with the same tail behaviour, we improve on the 
generalised Pareto distribution by following the approach introduced by  JUNKER AND 
SZIMAYER (2001) in allowing for a peak different from zero. Hence, the following loss 
function L(x) can be derived from expanding the support of GPD to R by an appropriate 
transformation, 
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for x > 0 (heavy tailed),  0 > b ,  0 > s  and  r˛R (for the treatment of x £ 0  see JUNKER AND 
SZIMAYER (2001)). 
 
Mapping of the loss function onto a distribution on the uniform interval of random variables 
in [ ] 0,1  is achieved by imposing a upper and lower bound on x such that  [ ] d d x ; - ˛  and  
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Subsequently,  U L  is formed with  [ ] ˛ 0,1 u  such that 
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with  d U  being the uniform distribution with  d - = min  and  = max d .  rr
- =
1() ud U  is gained 
through re-parameterisation, whilst b and s  are scale parameters dependent on the level of d , 
e.g. for  ¢ d  one obtains  bb
¢
¢=·
d
d
. The same holds true for  s  analogously. The following 
parameters have been chosen for the simulation: xb
- =====
44 0.4,26,7.5,10,10 u spd . This 
parameterisation results in 
- -=￿
7 1()610 Ld , which has the desired property of leaving the loss 
tail shape unaffected by the truncation.
8  
 
                                                 
8 Since  -= ()0.05 Ld  the density of  U L  does not revert to zero at point  = 0 u , which corresponds to the practical 
intuition of portfolio losses (reality check of uniform m apping assumption for the distribution of random 
variables on the uniform interval [0,1]).   
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7  RESULTS – TERM STRUCTURES OF DEFAULT RATES 
 
 
Table 2 exhibits the results of a Monte Carlo simulation with a sequence of one million 
iterations of normal inverse distributed (NID) portfolio losses  = for1,..., j Xjn , with the given 
portfolio parameters p=0.0026 and r=0.17, whereas Table 1 represents the simulations results 
if we apply extreme value theory (which encompasses the properties of the NID and allows 
for extreme events to be incorporated in the estimation on the basis of the given shape 
parameters). The probability  of default (commonly abbreviated as PD) is assumed to be 
constant for each period  j at this stage of our analysis, which is in line with the default 
standard of corporate loans proposed by issuers in their “offering circular” as constant or 
conditional default rate (“CDR”).  
 
The CDR represents an assumed rate of default each month, expressed as a per annum 
percentage of the aggregate principal balance of the loan claims that are not in default as of 
such month. It does not purport to be either a historical description of loan default or a 
predictive measure of the expected rate of default of any pool of loan claims, and, thus, does 
not impart compliance with possible fluctuations of portfolio default across time. Since banks 
calculate the CDR for analytical purposes only, it is not an accurate indicator or prediction of 
actual defaults and losses, as these are likely to differ in timing and amount from the assumed 
constant end-of-period loss at a constant rate of default.  For the purpose of the CDR 
calculation the outstanding principal balance of the loan claims that are not assumed to be in 
default is subjected to a periodic default percentage, which complements the monthly decline 
as a result of scheduled and unscheduled principal payments (prepayments) and expected 
amortisation. The assumed rate of prepayment and various other CDR assumptions translate 
into a decline of the outstanding principal balance of loan claims as reference base.  The 
erosion of the aggregate balance is further augmented by any loan claims that have already 
been in default as a consequence of the application of CDR in the preceding months, 
irrespective of whether defaulted loan claims are considered liquidated ( DEUTSCHE  BANK 
GLOBAL  MARKETS, 1998). Thus, a rise in prepayment rates directly affects a change in 
cumulative defaults.  
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Consequently, the CDR approach has found entry in the considerations of model assumptions 
with respect to properties of the reference portfolio of corporate loans. Besides keeping p 
constant, the reduction of the reference portfolio through prepayments and amortisation is 
ignored. Amid this simplification of actual accumulation of proceeds and default losses, it 
recognises the fact that prepayment speed higher than scheduled amortisation might not 
necessarily reduce aggregate losses, since loan claims with a high default probability are least 
likely to be prepaid. Furthermore, the timing of defaults is assumed to take place at the end of 
each period j to ensure consistency in the approximation of relative portfolio losses per period 
against the background of a declining principal balance. Pursuant to the CDR calculation the 
accumulation of periodic losses has been modelled in the previous section of this paper (see 
Eq. 0.4). 
 
The subsequent illustrations (Tabs. 1-4) exhibit the results of applying various distributions to 
the development of the principle balance of a loan collateral over time, with cumulative losses 
allocated to tranches according to seniority. The first column denotes the year, the second the 
respective (forward) default rate p and the third and fourth column list the mean and the 
standard deviation of the accumulated loss, the estimated expected loss  %k
j L ,  and the 
unexpected loss s %k
j L
. Since credit risk is measured by the volatility of losses, called unexpected 
loss, the generated results correspond to the distributional assumptions below (see Fig. 2 
below). 
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Figure 2. Volatility of credit losses as a measure of credit risk. 
 
The remaining columns report on the accumulated expected loss per tranche, whose 
boundaries have been chosen on the historical basis of most common security designs. In the 
various tranches all quantities increase monotonously on a cumulative basis, the intriguing 
insight is depicted in Figures A1-A4 (linear and logarithmic plots). 
 
The term structure of default rates of expected losses has been derived from both the normal 
inverse distribution in adaptation of the suggested model by VASICEK (1987) and an extreme 
value theory approach to Pareto distributed credit losses. Moreover, the analysis has been 
complemented by alternative cumulative distribution functions, a beta distribution and a 
negative binomial distribution (Tabs. 1 -4; complete tables with the simulation results of 
estimated and unexpected loss as an absolute share of total portfolio loss are included in the 
appendix as Tabs. 19-26). When all four distribution functions are compared with respect to 
accurate approximation of total portfolio losses, the estimated expected loss  %k
j L  and  the 
unexpected loss s %k
j L
. However, once we move to a tranche-based examination of the results 
for the various distributions, the expected loss in the distribution tails reflected i n the first 
tranche [0-2.4%]  %1
j L  showcases material differences across all four approaches. Also in the 
higher tranches as illustrated in Figure A8, the term structure between the normal inverse 
distribution and the beta-/negative-binomial distribution as well as the loss distribution 
according to extreme value theory deviate from each other at an increasing rate, especially in 
the mezzanine tranche [6.5%-9.0%].   
 
Considering the cumulative incidence of credit losses to be skewed towards the extreme end 
of the distribution, the normal inverse distribution seems to reflect the “loss reality” most 
truthfully.
9 According to OVERBECK AND WAGNER (2001) the q-q-plot of quantiles for the 
beta distribution versus the negative binomial distribution tends to indicate a high degree of 
similarity on the basis of matched first two moments, with cumulative probabilities reaching 
levels in the tune of 99.995%. This comparison has been completed ex post the adjustment of  
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results obtained from the negative-binomial distribution in dividing the discrete losses n by the 
some large number s.
10 Note that the observations tend to fall slightly below the diagonal in 
the q-q-plot, which is clearly rooted in the cut-off value of s. If the same analysis is applied in 
the context of extreme value theory the q -q-plot of quantiles for the Pareto-based loss 
function versus the normal inverse distribution (Fig. A12) bears out a clear deviation of EVT 
quantiles from the normal inverse distribution from 0.05 onwards. Consequently, the extreme 
value theory might be more attuned to illustrating sporadic credit loss whose statistical impact 
in expectation models defies the Gaussian assumptions of the normal inverse distribution. 
Since the degree of coincidence between probability masses is instrumental in predicting of 
how close the accumulated expected loss per tranche match for both distributions of portfolio 
loss, the almost identical results of accumulated expected loss per tranche for both the normal 
inverse distribution and the beta distribution do not come to a great surprise. As the proposed 
specialised form of a Pareto distribution places a premium on extreme events in line with 
extreme value theory, the results from the q-q plot hints to a mitigation of default rates for 
more senior “investor tranches”, whilst the first loss position is almost entirely exhausted by 
estimated default losses. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 See also ALTMAN AND SAUNDERS (1998). 
10 In this case  s=1000 generated the following parameter input values:  a=0.323278 and  b=80.4258 (see 
OVERBECK AND WAGNER (2001)).  
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7.1  Prime Distribution Functions 
 
7.1.1  Term Structure of Default Rates (Extreme Value Theory) 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005299  0.006512  0.207327  0.007653  0.002229  0.000797  0.000402  0.000023 
periodic      0.002701  0.001931  0.103042  0.004558  0.001242  0.000422  0.000214  0.000013 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007799  0.007978  0.308168  0.014546  0.003940  0.001332  0.000648  0.000037 
periodic      0.002500  0.001466  0.100841  0.006893  0.001711  0.000535  0.000246  0.000014 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010397  0.009228  0.406098  0.024665  0.006204  0.001994  0.000952  0.000051 
periodic      0.002598  0.001250  0.097930  0.010119  0.002264  0.000662  0.000304  0.000014 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012990  0.010317  0.500079  0.039278  0.009131  0.002777  0.001292  0.000067 
periodic      0.002593  0.001089  0.093981  0.014613  0.002927  0.000783  0.000340  0.000016 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015581  0.011252  0.589083  0.060005  0.012995  0.003645  0.001649  0.000082 
periodic      0.002591  0.000935  0.089004  0.020727  0.003864  0.000868  0.000357  0.000015 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018168  0.012104  0.671323  0.088676  0.018083  0.004711  0.002052  0.000098 
periodic        0.002587  0.000852  0.082240  0.028671  0.005088  0.001066  0.000403  0.000016 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005299  0.006512  0.178268  0.078295  0.041886  0.026340  0.019017  0.002261 
periodic      0.002701  0.001931  0.047327  0.027958  0.013639  0.008308  0.006004  0.000735 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007799  0.007978  0.208257  0.106408  0.055182  0.033976  0.024088  0.002737 
periodic      0.002500  0.001466  0.029989  0.028113  0.013296  0.007636  0.005071  0.000476 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010397  0.009228  0.226551  0.136470  0.068699  0.041584  0.029081  0.003191 
periodic      0.002598  0.001250  0.018294  0.030062  0.013517  0.007608  0.004993  0.000454 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012990  0.010317  0.235359  0.169272  0.082556  0.048863  0.033732  0.003616 
periodic      0.002593  0.001089  0.008808  0.032802  0.013857  0.007279  0.004651  0.000425 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015581  0.011252  0.235536  0.205001  0.097288  0.055601  0.038068  0.003977 
periodic      0.002591  0.000935  0.000177  0.035729  0.014732  0.006738  0.004336  0.000361 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018168  0.012104  0.227853  0.243130  0.113521  0.062720  0.042430  0.004301 
periodic        0.002587  0.000852  -0.007683  0.038129  0.016233  0.007119  0.004362  0.000324 
 
Table 1. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (EVT distribution of portfolio losses) per tranche 
on a cumulative and periodic basis with results for estimated and unexpected losses as absolute shares of total 
portfolio losses.  
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7.1.2  Term Structure of Default Rates (Normal Inverse Distribution) 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002593  0.004588  0.104352  0.004135  0.000830  0.000157  0.000041  0.000001 
periodic      0.002593  0.004588  0.104352  0.004135  0.000830  0.000157  0.000041  0.000001 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005186  0.006491  0.206350  0.010987  0.002129  0.000389  0.000110  0.000001 
periodic      0.002593  0.001903  0.101998  0.006852  0.001299  0.000232  0.000069  0.000000 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007771  0.007921  0.304995  0.021439  0.004068  0.000683  0.000177  0.000002 
periodic      0.002585  0.001430  0.098645  0.010452  0.001939  0.000294  0.000067  0.000001 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010356  0.009126  0.399452  0.036819  0.006922  0.001108  0.000261  0.000003 
periodic      0.002585  0.001205  0.094457  0.015380  0.002854  0.000425  0.000084  0.000001 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012934  0.010181  0.488493  0.058068  0.010884  0.001691  0.000392  0.000004 
periodic      0.002578  0.001055  0.089041  0.021249  0.003962  0.000583  0.000131  0.000001 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015500  0.011127  0.570866  0.086047  0.016401  0.002502  0.000559  0.000006 
periodic      0.002566  0.000946  0.082373  0.027979  0.005517  0.000811  0.000167  0.000002 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018059  0.011991  0.645940  0.121363  0.023847  0.003575  0.000777  0.000008 
periodic        0.002559  0.000864  0.075074  0.035316  0.007446  0.001073  0.000218  0.000002 
 
Table 2. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses) per 
tranche on a cumulative and periodic basis. 
 
 
 
8  VARIABLE PORTFOLIO Q UALITY  - CALCULATION OF THE 
DEFAULT RATES (EXPECTED/ESTIMATED AND 
UNEXPECTED) FOR ALL THE TRANCHES 
 
 
The time-dependent migration of asset quality of collateral during the term of the 
securitisation transaction is vital in the estimation of the loss cascading mechanism and its 
implications on the term structure of the individual tranches. Thus, the presented model has 
also been applied to both a normal inverse distribution and an extreme value distribution of 
collateral credit loss with varying forward rates of default (constant, increasing and 
decreasing). In the following section two extreme cases are investigated, i.e. a strictly 
deteriorating asset portfolio (back loaded) and a strictly improving portfolio (front loaded) 
with the corresponding effects on the tranching structure at hand in terms of estimated losses. 
Since a variable portfolio quality can be represented by means of an upward and downward 
drift of one-year default probabilities, the change in portfolio quality is replicated on the basis 
of a sequence if increasing and decreasing forward default probabilities p for both prime 
distributions – extreme value theory loss distribution and normal inverse loss distribution 
(Tabs. 5-6 and 7-8).  
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The presented model has been applied for both a normal inverse distribution and an extreme 
value distribution of collateral credit loss with varying forward rates of default (constant, 
increasing and decreasing). The typical structure of a CLO transaction reflected in the 
simulated allocation of losses to the various tranches elicits a peculiar dichotomy of default 
tolerance of the “first loss position” [0-2.4%] as opposed to the “investor tranches” [2.4-
3.9%], [3.9-6.5%], [6.5-9%] and [9-10.5%]. Figs. A5-A7 display the corresponding plots of a 
deteriorating and improving portfolio. With reference to the former, a comparison with Table 
1 and Figure 5 as well as Table 2 and Figure 7 showcases the increase of the first order 
moment of estimated expected loss 
k
j L %  per tranche (slope of estimated losses) as anticipated, 
whilst merely the first loss piece flattens from the fifth year onwards as this tranche begins to 
fill up to the maximum of losses to be absorbed. While the expected loss for the first tranche 
is a linear function of the time since commencement of the transaction, the expected losses of 
the other tranches increase in an exponential fashion over the years.  
 
Different forward rates of default losses are limited in altering this stark contrast only in the 
first periods of the CLO transaction, when an increase in the forward rate affects a smaller 
first moment of the [2.4-3.9%] tranche than for a decreasing forward rate in the context of a 
extreme value distribution. The reverse applies for a normal inverse distribution of cumulative 
default losses, where a change in the forward rate, be it an increase or decrease, directly 
translates into higher expected losses for investors without the marginal “default baggage” 
being absorbed by  the first loss position. With losses accumulating until the first CLO 
tranches has been fully exhausted such that subsequent tranches bear excess losses, periodic 
expected losses for a constant forward rate of an extreme value distribution subside 
asymptotically; this pattern is reflected in a concave shape of the default term structure of 
cumulative collateral losses.  
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00010  0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010 
cumulative  2  0.00123  0.006191  0.006508  0.248098  0.008190  0.002382  0.000833  0.000413  0.000023 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.145561  0.003188  0.001032  0.000366  0.000197  0.000012 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.010473  0.007834  0.416846  0.018131  0.004431  0.001373  0.000653  0.000034 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.174498  0.003318  0.000946  0.000311  0.000158  0.000009 
cumulative  4  0.00247  0.015278  0.009016  0.598044  0.039707  0.007968  0.002189  0.000976  0.000049 
periodic      0.004805  0.004461  0.196124  0.003444  0.000979  0.000336  0.000171  0.000010 
cumulative  5  0.00277  0.020389  0.010101  0.770975  0.088717  0.014413  0.003391  0.001416  0.000068 
periodic      0.005111  0.004540  0.208625  0.003570  0.001030  0.000365  0.000192  0.000011 
cumulative  6  0.00295  0.025679  0.011100  0.908023  0.195662  0.026506  0.005249  0.002007  0.000091 
periodic      0.005289  0.004583  0.215965  0.003606  0.001061  0.000374  0.000194  0.000012 
cumulative  7  0.00306  0.031064  0.011904  0.981059  0.389878  0.049962  0.008072  0.002774  0.000114 
periodic       0.005386  0.004303  0.220174  0.003614  0.001051  0.000347  0.000173  0.000008 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00010  0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526 
cumulative  2  0.00123  0.006191  0.006508  0.174874  0.080581  0.043399  0.026735  0.019296  0.002297 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.128459  0.050898  0.028846  0.017801  0.013353  0.001674 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.010473  0.007834  0.196178  0.116936  0.058216  0.034156  0.024201  0.002717 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.127236  0.051448  0.027190  0.016506  0.011817  0.001324 
cumulative  4  0.00247  0.015278  0.009016  0.195799  0.166620  0.076333  0.042914  0.029468  0.003226 
periodic      0.004805  0.004461  0.126626  0.052496  0.027589  0.017024  0.012409  0.001539 
cumulative  5  0.00277  0.020389  0.010101  0.168668  0.234645  0.100094  0.052945  0.035368  0.003746 
periodic      0.005111  0.004540  0.126135  0.053353  0.028524  0.017735  0.013319  0.001588 
cumulative  6  0.00295  0.025679  0.011100  0.113185  0.312582  0.131249  0.065124  0.041864  0.004305 
periodic      0.005289  0.004583  0.125604  0.053776  0.028916  0.018047  0.013306  0.001701 
cumulative  7  0.00306  0.031064  0.011904  0.048280  0.358264  0.172091  0.079550  0.048750  0.004631 
periodic       0.005386  0.004303  0.125246  0.053700  0.028669  0.017346  0.012474  0.001050 
 
Table 3. Simulation of a deteriorating portfolio (extreme value theory) with separate illustration of estimated 
and unexpected losses per tranche. 
 
 
In the case of rising annual default probabilities (Tab. 3 and Tab. 5), the cumulative expected 
loss of the first loss position increases less than linear as the upper boundary of the first loss 
piece does not compare favourably with the exposure of this tranche induced by the high 
default rate during the initial years. Thus, the deviation of the tranche retained by the issuer 
and the outstanding, more senior tranches is a reflection of the rapid exhaustion of the loss 
absorption by the first loss tranche before excess losses are passed onto the higher tranche.  
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00367  0.006005  0.004523  0.245673  0.003844  0.001091  0.000378  0.000182  0.000009 
periodic      0.006005  0.004523  0.245673  0.003844  0.001091  0.000378  0.000182  0.000009 
cumulative  2  0.00267  0.011014  0.006328  0.445650  0.012637  0.003011  0.000892  0.000419  0.000020 
periodic      0.005009  0.004429  0.204375  0.003659  0.001085  0.000360  0.000178  0.000009 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.015296  0.007696  0.608457  0.030299  0.005900  0.001564  0.000693  0.000032 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.174498  0.003318  0.000946  0.000311  0.000158  0.000009 
cumulative  4  0.00154  0.019189  0.008889  0.742734  0.063996  0.010507  0.002531  0.001046  0.000047 
periodic      0.003894  0.004440  0.158171  0.003325  0.001020  0.000345  0.000169  0.000009 
cumulative  5  0.00123  0.022782  0.010016  0.846424  0.121583  0.017450  0.003799  0.001493  0.000066 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.145561  0.003188  0.001032  0.000366  0.000197  0.000012 
cumulative  6  0.00094  0.026099  0.011032  0.917378  0.206659  0.027686  0.005460  0.002017  0.000086 
periodic      0.003317  0.004623  0.134103  0.003262  0.001042  0.000364  0.000176  0.000010 
cumulative  7  0.00083  0.029309  0.011953  0.961671  0.318082  0.042558  0.007584  0.002645  0.000107 
periodic       0.003209  0.004607  0.129703  0.003157  0.000987  0.000365  0.000195  0.000011 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00367  0.006005  0.004523  0.124453  0.055172  0.029266  0.018088  0.012631  0.001715 
periodic      0.006005  0.004523  0.124453  0.055172  0.029266  0.018088  0.012631  0.001715 
cumulative  2  0.00267  0.011014  0.006328  0.159532  0.097505  0.047893  0.027566  0.019229  0.002198 
periodic      0.005009  0.004429  0.126442  0.054316  0.029122  0.017752  0.012535  0.001253 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.015296  0.007696  0.170597  0.145666  0.065797  0.036069  0.024743  0.002656 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.127236  0.051448  0.027190  0.016506  0.011817  0.001324 
cumulative  4  0.00154  0.019189  0.008889  0.162596  0.202429  0.086183  0.045515  0.030438  0.003059 
periodic      0.003894  0.004440  0.128220  0.051941  0.028494  0.017093  0.012322  0.001283 
cumulative  5  0.00123  0.022782  0.010016  0.138867  0.262821  0.108775  0.055492  0.036301  0.003628 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.128459  0.050898  0.028846  0.017801  0.013353  0.001674 
cumulative  6  0.00094  0.026099  0.011032  0.106689  0.317039  0.133944  0.066194  0.041936  0.004178 
periodic      0.003317  0.004623  0.129227  0.051637  0.028862  0.017647  0.012598  0.001760 
cumulative  7  0.00083  0.029309  0.011953  0.072741  0.354321  0.161875  0.077491  0.047751  0.004688 
periodic       0.003209  0.004607  0.128773  0.050739  0.028080  0.017886  0.013405  0.001735 
 
Table 4. Simulation of improving portfolio (extreme value theory) with separate illustration of estimated and 
unexpected losses per tranche. 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002593  0.004579  0.104369  0.004101  0.000831  0.000147  0.000039  0.000001 
periodic      0.002593  0.004579  0.104369  0.004101  0.000831  0.000147  0.000039  0.000001 
cumulative  2  0.0036  0.006178  0.007552  0.241895  0.016947  0.003589  0.000685  0.000200  0.000004 
periodic      0.003585  0.002973  0.137526  0.012846  0.002758  0.000538  0.000161  0.000003 
cumulative  3  0.0043  0.010451  0.010198  0.393470  0.045190  0.010055  0.001928  0.000516  0.000008 
periodic      0.004273  0.002646  0.151575  0.028243  0.006466  0.001243  0.000316  0.000004 
cumulative  4  0.0048  0.015207  0.012650  0.542116  0.096050  0.023047  0.004522  0.001182  0.000016 
periodic      0.004756  0.002452  0.148646  0.050860  0.012992  0.002594  0.000666  0.000008 
cumulative  5  0.0051  0.020238  0.014826  0.673930  0.172279  0.044946  0.009036  0.002325  0.000030 
periodic      0.005031  0.002176  0.131814  0.076229  0.021899  0.004514  0.001143  0.000014 
cumulative  6  0.0053  0.025426  0.016816  0.780726  0.271508  0.078663  0.016656  0.004250  0.000054 
periodic      0.005188  0.001990  0.106796  0.099229  0.033717  0.007620  0.001925  0.000024 
cumulative  7  0.0054  0.030681  0.018618  0.860469  0.386342  0.125166  0.028539  0.007366  0.000094 
periodic       0.005255  0.001802  0.079743  0.114834  0.046503  0.011883  0.003116  0.000040 
 
Table 5. Simulation of deteriorating portfolio (normal inverse distribution) with separate illustration of 
estimated losses per tranche. 
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0060  0.005992  0.006269  0.241622  0.010208  0.001379  0.000144  0.000023  0.000000 
periodic      0.005992  0.006269  0.241622  0.010208  0.001379  0.000144  0.000023  0.000000 
cumulative  2  0.0050  0.010961  0.008220  0.431596  0.032250  0.004144  0.000389  0.000061  0.000000 
periodic      0.004969  0.001951  0.189974  0.022042  0.002765  0.000245  0.000037  0.000000 
cumulative  3  0.0043  0.015214  0.009431  0.580569  0.068669  0.008830  0.000719  0.000097  0.000001 
periodic      0.004253  0.001211  0.148973  0.036419  0.004686  0.000330  0.000037  0.000000 
cumulative  4  0.0039  0.019060  0.010333  0.698890  0.121829  0.016286  0.001245  0.000147  0.000001 
periodic      0.003846  0.000902  0.118321  0.053160  0.007456  0.000526  0.000050  0.000000 
cumulative  5  0.0036  0.022595  0.011046  0.790304  0.190679  0.027340  0.002020  0.000225  0.000001 
periodic      0.003535  0.000713  0.091414  0.068850  0.011054  0.000775  0.000078  0.000000 
cumulative  6  0.0033  0.025819  0.011616  0.857477  0.270135  0.042336  0.003105  0.000323  0.000001 
periodic      0.003224  0.000570  0.067173  0.079456  0.014996  0.001085  0.000098  0.000000 
cumulative  7  0.0032  0.028936  0.012125  0.907148  0.359962  0.062859  0.004687  0.000454  0.000002 
periodic       0.003117  0.000509  0.049671  0.089827  0.020523  0.001582  0.000131  0.000000 
 
Table 6. Simulation of improving portfolio (normal inverse distribution) with separate illustration of 
estimated losses per tranche. 
 
 
9  CALCULATION OF THE D EFAULT RATES 
(EXPECTED/ESTIMATED  AND UNEXPECTED) FOR  ALL 
THE TRANCHES UNDER LOSS RECOVERY 
 
 
The development of portfolio losses can also be considered  in the context of loss recovery, 
which mitigates periodic default loss. We update each tranche k for each time period j, given 
the simulation results in section 7. The random variable X denotes the total amount of loan 
default loss of the underlying reference portfolio during a given year with random default. 
Hence, X can be written as  XIB =·, where I is a discriminate random variable indicator, 
which denotes the uniform probability p of default loss to occur in  
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and B represents the amount of bad debt actually written off in the case of default, indicated 
by  1 I = , upon loan recovery of  m  of the individual loan value. Hence, adjusting for loan 
recovery yields the density function of default loss below: 
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In other words, B is commensurate to the capacity of loan originators to allay loss severity by 
appropriating the maximum residual loan value (i.e. the pledged collateral) included in the 
securitised reference portfolio. The mean and the standard deviation of  B is denoted as 
B m m =  and  B s , so that  ()~(,) BBB fxN ms . The probability p of loan default could either be 
static or variable  (see section 8) if we were to consider dynamic credit performance in a multi-
period setting. 
 
So for each tranche k at any point in time j, we can refine the loss function  ()
k
j LX  of total 
default loss 
k
j X  by adjusting for some loss recovery factor B, which mitigates default loss 
allocated to each “senioritised” tranche by the factor 1 m - . Hence, the new loss function  
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does not betray the acknowledgement – though admittedly simplistic – of recovering bad debt 
in loan servicing as a pivotal consideration in determining the value of the securitised 
reference portfolio as an underlying asset in pricing contingent claims. Successful debtor 
monitoring and workout proceedings ultimately lower the discount investors demand from 
issuers in the form of spreads over some benchmark market interest rate. 
 
Thus, we need to derive the formulae of the expected and unexpected loss (mean and 
standard deviation) of the new loss function  ˆ ()
k
j LX , which is a function of the capacity of 
bad debt recovery on the existing loss function  ( ) = ˆ ()()
kk
jj LXfLX. 
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so that  
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Hence, 
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Since we conditioned the mean and variance of X on the case of default (I=1), we need to 
incorporate both the mean value of losses 
k
j m  and the volatility of underlying asset loss 
2
k
j m s  
for each period and tranche in order to do justice to the definition  ( ) = ˆ ()()
kk
jj LXfLX. First, 
m itself is a proportion of the nominal expected loss, where 
k
j p m =  for an initial portfolio 
value of 1 in period  0 j = , such that eq. 24 yields 
 
  mm =· Xj m.  (0.26) 
 
Second, given  ( )
22 cov,0 k
j B m ss =  we transpose eqs. 27 and 28 to 
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  ( ) sm mss =·+ 2
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and 
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Hence, 
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In keeping with the notation used in this paper, we write  
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where  
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Based on the above formulae we recalculate Tables 9-11 for a mean recovery rate of 45% for 
both the total periodic losses of the entire portfolio  ˆ () j LX  and each tranche after loss 
cascading  ˆ ()
k
j LX  for both constant and variable default rates (analogous to section 8 above). 
By imposing the additional condition of bad debt recovery on our simulation results in section 
7 we privilege equally the pivotal role of both the probability of debtor default and the ability 
of loan servicers of the underlying reference portfolio to affect the loss cascading mechanism 
in pricing loan securitisation. We specify the above expressions (equations 35 and 36) to  
 
  m =· k
j X pm   (0.33) 
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and 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) m sss =+-++
2222 11 kk
jj B X pmpp ,  (0.34) 
 
where  = 0.45 m and  s = 0.1 B .
11 We also obtain new measures for the time-dependent 
relationship between unexpected and expected loss after recovery (see Appendix, Tabs. 31-
34). For matters of conciseness we only provide results for extreme value theory in this regard. 
 
9.1  Term Structure of Default Rates (Extreme Value Theory) – Constant Default 
Rate and Recovery 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.001169  0.005144  0.046928  0.001393  0.000444  0.000169  0.000085  0.000005 
periodic      0.001169  0.005144  0.046928  0.001393  0.000444  0.000169  0.000085  0.000005 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.002385  0.007652  0.093297  0.003444  0.001003  0.000359  0.000181  0.000010 
periodic      0.001215  0.002509  0.046369  0.002051  0.000559  0.000190  0.000096  0.000006 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.003510  0.009652  0.138676  0.006546  0.001773  0.000599  0.000292  0.000017 
periodic      0.001125  0.002000  0.045378  0.003102  0.000770  0.000241  0.000111  0.000006 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.004679  0.011456  0.182744  0.011099  0.002792  0.000897  0.000428  0.000023 
periodic      0.001169  0.001804  0.044069  0.004554  0.001019  0.000298  0.000137  0.000006 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.005846  0.013097  0.225036  0.017675  0.004109  0.001250  0.000581  0.000030 
periodic      0.001167  0.001641  0.042291  0.006576  0.001317  0.000352  0.000153  0.000007 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.007011  0.014584  0.265087  0.027002  0.005848  0.001640  0.000742  0.000037 
periodic      0.001166  0.001487  0.040052  0.009327  0.001739  0.000391  0.000161  0.000007 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.008176  0.015987  0.302095  0.039904  0.008137  0.002120  0.000923  0.000044 
periodic        0.001164  0.001403  0.037008  0.012902  0.002290  0.000480  0.000181  0.000007 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.001169  0.005144  0.163522  0.051118  0.028475  0.018115  0.013054  0.001528 
periodic      0.001169  0.005144  0.163522  0.051118  0.028475  0.018115  0.013054  0.001528 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.002385  0.007652  0.234452  0.080123  0.042382  0.026512  0.019102  0.002266 
periodic      0.001215  0.002509  0.070930  0.029005  0.013907  0.008397  0.006049  0.000738 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.003510  0.009652  0.285836  0.109816  0.056047  0.034260  0.024224  0.002745 
periodic      0.001125  0.002000  0.051384  0.029694  0.013665  0.007748  0.005122  0.000479 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.004679  0.011456  0.323820  0.142212  0.070052  0.042007  0.029280  0.003201 
periodic      0.001169  0.001804  0.037984  0.032396  0.014005  0.007747  0.005056  0.000457 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.005846  0.013097  0.350708  0.178411  0.084541  0.049450  0.034002  0.003630 
periodic      0.001167  0.001641  0.026888  0.036199  0.014489  0.007443  0.004721  0.000428 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.007011  0.014584  0.367329  0.218992  0.100110  0.056370  0.038412  0.003994 
periodic      0.001166  0.001487  0.016621  0.040582  0.015569  0.006920  0.004410  0.000364 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.008176  0.015987  0.374306  0.263857  0.117451  0.063712  0.042857  0.004321 
periodic        0.001164  0.001403  0.006977  0.044864  0.017341  0.007342  0.004445  0.000327 
 
                                                 
11 We assume the recovery rate to take the value 45 percent in accordance with the industry standard and the 
specifications set forth by the Basle Committee (1999).  
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Table 7. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (EVT distribution of portfolio losses) per tranche 
on a cumulative and periodic basis with results for estimated and unexpected losses as absolute shares of total 
portfolio losses under loss recovery. 
 
 
9.2  Term Structure of Default Rates (Extreme Value Theory) – Variable Default 
Rate and Recovery 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00010  0.001169  0.005144  0.046928  0.001393  0.000444  0.000169  0.000085  0.000005 
periodic      0.001169  0.005144  0.046928  0.001393  0.000444  0.000169  0.000085  0.000005 
cumulative  2  0.00123  0.002786  0.010547  0.111644  0.003686  0.001072  0.000375  0.000186  0.000010 
periodic      0.001617  0.005404  0.065502  0.001435  0.000464  0.000165  0.000089  0.000005 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.004713  0.015838  0.187581  0.008159  0.001994  0.000618  0.000294  0.000015 
periodic      0.001927  0.005291  0.078524  0.001493  0.000426  0.000140  0.000071  0.000004 
cumulative  4  0.00247  0.006875  0.021337  0.269120  0.017868  0.003586  0.000985  0.000439  0.000022 
periodic      0.002162  0.005499  0.088256  0.001550  0.000441  0.000151  0.000077  0.000005 
cumulative  5  0.00277  0.009175  0.026981  0.346939  0.039923  0.006486  0.001526  0.000637  0.000031 
periodic      0.002300  0.005644  0.093881  0.001607  0.000464  0.000164  0.000086  0.000005 
cumulative  6  0.00295  0.011555  0.032706  0.408610  0.088048  0.011928  0.002362  0.000903  0.000041 
periodic      0.002380  0.005725  0.097184  0.001623  0.000477  0.000168  0.000087  0.000005 
cumulative  7  0.00306  0.013979  0.038171  0.441477  0.175445  0.022483  0.003632  0.001248  0.000051 
periodic       0.002424  0.005465  0.099078  0.001626  0.000473  0.000156  0.000078  0.000004 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00010  0.001169  0.005144  0.163522  0.051118  0.028475  0.018115  0.013054  0.001528 
periodic      0.001169  0.005144  0.163522  0.051118  0.028475  0.018115  0.013054  0.001528 
cumulative  2  0.00123  0.002786  0.010547  0.335880  0.102822  0.057559  0.035996  0.026449  0.003204 
periodic      0.001617  0.005404  0.172358  0.051704  0.029085  0.017882  0.013396  0.001676 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.004713  0.015838  0.514505  0.155111  0.084966  0.052570  0.038300  0.004530 
periodic      0.001927  0.005291  0.178626  0.052289  0.027407  0.016574  0.011851  0.001326 
cumulative  4  0.00247  0.006875  0.021337  0.697911  0.208483  0.112781  0.069668  0.050746  0.006071 
periodic      0.002162  0.005499  0.183406  0.053372  0.027814  0.017098  0.012446  0.001541 
cumulative  5  0.00277  0.009175  0.026981  0.883815  0.262747  0.141542  0.087484  0.064106  0.007662 
periodic      0.002300  0.005644  0.185904  0.054264  0.028762  0.017815  0.013360  0.001590 
cumulative  6  0.00295  0.011555  0.032706  0.070855  0.317445  0.170704  0.105613  0.077454  0.009365 
periodic      0.002380  0.005725  0.187040  0.054698  0.029161  0.018129  0.013348  0.001703 
cumulative  7  0.00306  0.013979  0.038171  0.258468  0.372068  0.199616  0.123035  0.089965  0.010417 
periodic       0.002424  0.005465  0.187613  0.054624  0.028912  0.017422  0.012511  0.001052 
 
Table 8. Simulation of a deteriorating portfolio (extreme value theory) with separate illustration of estimated 
and unexpected losses per tranche under loss recovery. 
 
 
Under consideration of loss recovery during the life of the transaction for both deteriorating 
and improving quality of the underying portfolio Table 8 above and Table 9 below) the 
cumulative expected loss of the first loss position substantiates similar properties as simulation 
results presented in section 7 for extreme value theory. Again, we detect a sizeable dichotomy 
between the first loss position and the more senior tranches due to the loss absorbing effect  
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of the first loss tranche. At the same time the degree of unexpected loss in relation to 
expected default loss increases in the seniority of issued tranches, with first loss position 
exhibiting a more accurate prediction of its default exposure. 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00367  0.002702  0.005819  0.110553  0.001730  0.000491  0.000170  0.000082  0.000004 
periodic      0.002702  0.005819  0.110553  0.001730  0.000491  0.000170  0.000082  0.000004 
cumulative  2  0.00267  0.004956  0.011329  0.200543  0.005687  0.001355  0.000401  0.000189  0.000009 
periodic      0.002254  0.005511  0.091969  0.001647  0.000488  0.000162  0.000080  0.000004 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.006883  0.016620  0.273806  0.013635  0.002655  0.000704  0.000312  0.000014 
periodic      0.001927  0.005291  0.078524  0.001493  0.000426  0.000140  0.000071  0.000004 
cumulative  4  0.00154  0.008636  0.021902  0.334230  0.028798  0.004728  0.001139  0.000471  0.000021 
periodic      0.001752  0.005282  0.071177  0.001496  0.000459  0.000155  0.000076  0.000004 
cumulative  5  0.00123  0.010252  0.027306  0.380891  0.054712  0.007853  0.001710  0.000672  0.000030 
periodic      0.001617  0.005404  0.065502  0.001435  0.000464  0.000165  0.000089  0.000005 
cumulative  6  0.00094  0.011745  0.032647  0.412820  0.092997  0.012459  0.002457  0.000908  0.000039 
periodic      0.001493  0.005341  0.060346  0.001468  0.000469  0.000164  0.000079  0.000005 
cumulative  7  0.00083  0.013189  0.037948  0.432752  0.143137  0.019151  0.003413  0.001190  0.000048 
periodic       0.001444  0.005302  0.058366  0.001421  0.000444  0.000164  0.000088  0.000005 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume) 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00367  0.002702  0.005819  0.192579  0.056160  0.029519  0.018171  0.012670  0.001717 
periodic      0.002702  0.005819  0.192579  0.056160  0.029519  0.018171  0.012670  0.001717 
cumulative  2  0.00267  0.004956  0.011329  0.377811  0.111413  0.058892  0.036003  0.025243  0.002972 
periodic      0.002254  0.005511  0.185232  0.055253  0.029373  0.017831  0.012573  0.001255 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.006883  0.016620  0.556437  0.163702  0.086299  0.052577  0.037094  0.004298 
periodic      0.001927  0.005291  0.178626  0.052289  0.027407  0.016574  0.011851  0.001326 
cumulative  4  0.00154  0.008636  0.021902  0.731917  0.216487  0.115029  0.069746  0.049453  0.005582 
periodic      0.001752  0.005282  0.175480  0.052785  0.028730  0.017169  0.012358  0.001285 
cumulative  5  0.00123  0.010252  0.027306  0.904274  0.268191  0.144113  0.087627  0.062848  0.007259 
periodic      0.001617  0.005404  0.172358  0.051704  0.029085  0.017882  0.013396  0.001676 
cumulative  6  0.00094  0.011745  0.032647  0.074359  0.320655  0.173216  0.105354  0.075484  0.009021 
periodic      0.001493  0.005341  0.170084  0.052464  0.029103  0.017727  0.012636  0.001762 
cumulative  7  0.00083  0.013189  0.037948  0.242705  0.372192  0.201524  0.123321  0.088931  0.010758 
periodic       0.001444  0.005302  0.168346  0.051537  0.028307  0.017966  0.013447  0.001737 
 
Table 9. Simulation of improving portfolio (extreme value theory) with separate illustration of estimated and 
unexpected losses per tranche under loss recovery. 
 
 
10  RISK-NEUTRAL PRICING OF CLO TRANCHES 
 
 
The proportion of collateral losses allocated to each tranche of a CLO transaction according 
to contractual prioritisation constitutes a default rate, which serves as a basis for the 
calculation of its risk-neutral price. In the risk-neutral valuation of CLOs we do is nothing else 
but extend concepts and meanings of accepted principles of asset pricing under symmetric 
information to an asymmetric information context, where expected losses are the risk 
premium, as unexpected losses cannot be determined in a straightforward fashion without  
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incorporating some simplifying assumptions. The proposed risk-neutral pricing of CLO 
tranches heavily draws on risky bond analysis and the analysis of the term structure of credit 
spreads (LELAND AND TOFT, 1996). Hence, the definition of the threshold, which determines 
the accepted credit exposure of noteholders in an ordinary fixed income transaction, is 
adapted to fit the expected term structure of credit losses (loss distribution) of CLO 
transactions for purposes of risk-based profit management of loan portfolios. Further, we 
consider the spreads of investors of each tranche (above the risk-free rate, be it fixed or 
stochastic) equal to the risk premium associated with expected losses. We  subsequently 
compare the required risk-neutral rate of return of each tranche to the pricing of bonds of 
amenable quality, matched first moments and maturity. 
 
In absence of arbitrage in efficient markets risk-neutrality corresponds to a “good deal” 
proposition in the security design of CLOs, such that the tranche spreads reflect a certain 
expectation of future losses. Hence, the value of each CLO tranche ought to be driven by the 
valuation of interest proceeds generated from the securitised asset portfolio, subject to a 
certain degree of attrition, such as debtor default and prepayments. Given the estimated 
default rates per tranche of the transaction, we are now in the position to compute the rates of 
return for each individual tranche by calculating the net present value of expected cash flows 
according to  
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where 
= ￿ %
1
m k
j j L  denotes the accumulated expected loss in the tranche k up to year j and  f r  
represents the risk-free forward rate during the applicable time period. By solving the equation 
above for  k r  over j=7 for each tranche, the following results are obtained for a collateral 
portfolio with a constant, a deteriorating and an improving forward rate of default at a 
constant risk-free rate  == 5.0%
l ff rr  for each time period (Tab. 10).  
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In absence of an appropriate analytical approach to capture the complexity of loan 
securitisation, investors are inclined to deal with such structure finance products in an 
undifferentiated way as especially senior tranches of CLOs are regarded as virtually risk-free 
(BURGHARDT, 2001). Given that this shortcoming results in notorious mispricing as risks are 
underestimated, the presented method of deriving the returns of CLO tranches based on the 
term structure of periodic defaults might provide guidance as to the proper mean-variance 
consistent pricing of CLO transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Investor spreads in the various tranches under two different default distributions of the collateral 
portfolio (extreme value theory (EVT) and normal inverse distribution (NID)) on a cumulative basis for 
constant, increasing and decreasing forward rates of loan default. 
 
 
The above spreads are the risk-neutral returns of the relevant tranches based on a normal 
inverse distribution and an extreme value distribution of collateral default. The first loss 
position [0-2.4%] retained by sponsor of the transaction as credit enhancement absorbs most 
of the periodic losses throughout the lifetime of the transaction (that is, seven years in this 
model), and, thus, the expected spread of risk-neutral investors amounts to a cumulative 
average annual return of 20.35 % and 20.56% for either case of loss distribution, i.e. normal 
inverse distribution (NID) and Pareto-like distribution according to extreme value theory 
(EVT) of credit events in the reference portfolio. Successive tranches claim lower 
spreads/returns as their default tolerance decreases from a maximum accumulated credit loss 
of 6.29% (EVT)) and 6.79% (NID) of notational value for the [2.4-3.9%] tranche to almost 
the risk-free rate of return for the [10.5-100%] senior tranche.  
 
Generally, the prediction of expected investor returns significantly varies with the 
methodology applied in modelling credit risk of the underlying reference portfolio. In all 
tranches but the [3.9-6.5%] mezzanine “investor” tranche default losses under the EVT model 
cum. (EVT/const.) 20.34747% 6.28610% 5.25952% 5.06849% 5.03000% 5.00140%
cum. (NID/const.) 20.56017% 6.79431% 5.33870% 5.05067% 5.01100% 5.00010%
cum. (EVT/deter.) 37.49613% 10.81930% 5.69241% 5.11364% 5.03970% 5.00160%
cum. (NID/deter.) 30.43862% 10.19510% 6.78903% 5.39333% 5.10090% 5.00120%
cum. (EVT/improv.) 49.12123% 9.87893% 5.60218% 5.10820% 5.03820% 5.00150%
cum. (NID/improv.) 42.75610% 10.94410% 6.00440% 5.06577% 5.00640% 5.00000%
Distribution and Collateral Performance Returns per Tranche
Constant 
Deteriorating
Improving
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L 
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protrude the projection of credit loss under the NID approach for a constant forward rate of 
default. The pattern of a higher degree of estimated default under the extreme value approach 
is consistent for the first loss position only if we extend the exposition of expected risk-neutral 
returns per tranche to the case of a deteriorating and improving collateral quality. 
 
The change of the periodic forward rate of credit default entails higher returns for all tranches, 
irrespective of whether the first moment of the terms structure is positive or negative. In this 
context an intriguing paradox of expected returns for each tranche emerges. An increasing 
forward rate of default (deteriorating portfolio quality) is actually more favourable for the first 
loss piece compared to a decline in the periodic default rate. For mezzanine and senior 
tranches spreads are lower under an improving rather than a deteriorating rate of default. The 
credit enhancement commands risk-neutral spreads well beyond 3 0% per period (for a 
deteriorating portfolio) and 40% per period (for an improving portfolio) and reduces the 
chances of collateral default for mezzanine and senior tranches accordingly. These 
diametrically opposite expectations as to risk-neutral returns  for the issuer (who generally 
retains the first loss position) and investors (who hold the mezzanine and senior tranches) is 
robust even if the second moment of the forward rate is changed for both deterioration and 
improvement of portfolio quality. Thus,  an increase in the default rate of the collateral 
portfolio over time (deteriorating portfolio quality) requires a lower default tolerance and 
correspondingly lower risk-neutral spreads per period from holders of the most junior tranche 
(credit enhancement), as the second moment of expected losses of an improving collateral 
portfolio is smaller than it is for a deteriorating portfolio, provided that first moments are 
matched. Conversely, spreads of the first loss position are less sensitive to a reduction in the 
collateral default rate as long as the first period defaults are set at a level such that the risk 
horizon of seven years is insufficient to offset higher risk-neutral returns (due to portfolio 
deterioration) to the level of a constant forward rate.  The application of EVT in the 
determination of total cumulative portfolio default loss pronounces this effect, as the flat tail 
behaviour of this Pareto-style distribution puts more weight on the first tranches as credit 
enhancement.   
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11  REALITY CHECK 
 
11.1  Ratio of estimated and unexpected losses 
 
 
The spreads actually offered to investors (returns minus the assumed risk-free rate), however, 
price significantly wider than the derived risk-neutral returns and defy the above assumption 
of risk-neutral expectations in deriving the term structure of CLO tranches. Since this 
observation is not all too surprising in the light of the complexity of securitisation structures, 
the spread concession solicits complementary inferences drawn from investment choices that 
largely cause generic asset backed structures to be usually cheaper than plain vanilla corporate 
bonds. Investors might just command higher returns for CLO tranches on the theory that not 
only liquidity or other additional risks, but also the degree of unexpected loss matters in the 
mean-variance trade-off of financial investment.
12 The relationship between unexpected and 
expected loss (ratio of unexpected and expected loss  k
j
k
j L L s % % ) epitomises a margin of error in 
the estimation of a loss function to describe the distribution of credit losses. If applied to the 
entire portfolio in general and all tranches in particular for cumulative as well as periodic 
losses (in the case of both NID and EVT credit risk loss functions) it could substantiate this 
conjecture as a reality check as to the viability of risk neutral spreads.  
 
Whilst all ratios decrease over time at a rate similar to a normal inverse distribution setting 
(Figs. A4 and A5), the EVT loss function suggest a lower starting value during the first year of 
the securitisation transaction especially for the first loss position retained by the issuer and the 
senior piece [10.5-100%]. Most importantly, the application of an EVT in the disclosure of 
unexpected losses  s %k
j L
 p er tranche complements this observation in a most insightful way, 
since apparently asymptotic development of the variance in portfolio losses allocated to the 
first loss position of the issuer [0-2.4%] augments the favourable property of a linear increase 
of the  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for the first loss piece. At the same time the required spread for the first 
                                                 
12 Synthetic bank CLOs feature even higher spreads than traditional CLOs. This pricing disparity is frequently 
attributed to the fact that lower secondary liquidity, a less receptive investor base for credit derivative based 
products and additional risk arising from the increased leverage of the senior tranches in partially funded 
structures are prime characteristics bearing additional exposure for investors in synthetic CLOs (BATCHVAROV 
ET AL. 2000).  
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tranche does not attract additional compensation for excessive variations in unexpected losses 
s %k
j L
. As EVT estimates reduce the margin of error compared to other distributions, a 
verification of risk-neutral spreads on CLO tranches seems to be more realistic. Thus, Tables 
1, 2 and 13 (where extreme value theory is applied to portfolio losses) are a consequence of a 
“canonical theory for the (limit) distribution of normalised maxima of independent, identically 
distributed random variables” (EMBRECHTS, 2000), which effects more weight being attached 
to credit losses of extreme events absorbed by the first loss position and the alleviation of 
default risk imposed on more senior “investor tranches”.  
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      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 per tranche  
cum./per.  Yr  p   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.763279  0.255607  16.263974  28.619048  48.085333  69.218085  152.600000 
periodic      0.763279  0.255607  16.263974  28.619048  48.085333  69.218085  152.600000 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.228911  0.859840  10.230629  18.791386  33.048934  47.305970  98.304348 
periodic      0.714920  0.459298  6.133831  10.981481  19.687204  28.056075  56.538462 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.022952  0.675790  7.315276  14.005584  25.507508  37.172840  73.972973 
periodic      0.586400  0.297389  4.078485  7.770894  14.272897  20.613821  34.000000 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.887564  0.557873  5.532941  10.073340  20.854564  30.547269  62.568627 
periodic      0.481139  0.186807  2.970847  5.970406  10.492447  16.424342  32.428571 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.794226  0.470644  4.309588  9.041288  17.595607  26.108359  53.970149 
periodic      0.419977  0.093721  2.244714  4.734199  9.296296  13.679412  26.562500 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.722162  0.399835  3.416399  7.486572  15.254047  23.085506  48.500000 
periodic      0.360865  0.001989  0.723790  3.812629  7.762673  12.145658  24.066667 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.666226  0.339409  2.741779  6.277775  13.313522  20.677388  43.887755 
periodic       0.329339  -0.093422  0.329880  3.190448  6.678236  10.823821  20.250000 
 
Table 11.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for each tranche based on a simulation of constant forward probability rates 
(EVT distribution of portfolio losses). 
 
 
      Unexpect. 
divided by 
exp. losses 
s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 per tranche  
cum./per.  Yr  ru   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.000100  0.763279  0.255607  16.263974  28.619048  48.085333  69.218085  152.600000 
periodic      0.763279  0.255607  16.263974  28.619048  48.085333  69.218085  152.600000 
cumulative  2  0.001231  0.051203  0.704859  9.838950  18.219563  32.094838  46.721550  99.869565 
periodic      0.287503  0.882510  15.965496  27.951550  48.636612  67.781726  139.500000 
cumulative  3  0.001945  0.748019  0.470625  6.449506  13.138343  24.876912  37.061256  79.911765 
periodic      0.019617  0.729154  15.505726  28.742072  53.073955  74.791139  147.111111 
cumulative  4  0.002469  0.590130  0.327399  4.196237  9.579945  19.604386  30.192623  65.836735 
periodic      0.928408  0.645643  15.242741  28.180797  50.666667  72.567251  153.900000 
cumulative  5  0.002771  0.495414  0.218772  2.644871  6.944703  15.613388  24.977401  55.088235 
periodic      0.888280  0.604602  14.944818  27.693204  48.589041  69.369792  144.363636 
cumulative  6  0.002954  0.432260  0.124650  0.597561  4.951671  12.406935  20.858994  47.307692 
periodic      0.866515  0.581594  14.912923  27.253534  48.254011  68.587629  140.750000 
cumulative  7  0.003055  0.383209  0.049212  0.918913  3.444438  9.855055  17.573901  40.622807 
periodic       0.798923  0.568850  14.858882  27.277831  49.988473  72.104046  130.250000 
 
Table 12.  k
j
k
j L L s % % ratio for each tranche based on a simulation of increasing forward probability rates of a 
deteriorating portfolio (EVT distribution of portfolio losses). 
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      Unexpect. 
divided by 
exp. losses 
s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 per tranche  
cum./per.  Yr  ru   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.003673  0.753206  0.506580  14.352758  26.824931  47.851852  69.401099  190.555556 
periodic      0.753206  0.506580  14.352758  26.824931  47.851852  69.401099  190.555556 
cumulative  2  0.002669  0.574541  0.357976  7.715834  15.906011  30.903587  45.892601  109.900000 
periodic      0.884208  0.618676  14.844493  26.840553  49.311111  70.421348  139.222222 
cumulative  3  0.001945  0.503138  0.280376  4.807617  10.152034  23.062020  35.704185  83.000000 
periodic      0.019617  0.729154  15.505726  28.742072  53.073955  74.791139  147.111111 
cumulative  4  0.001538  0.463234  0.218916  3.163151  8.202436  17.983011  29.099426  65.085106 
periodic      0.140216  0.810642  15.621353  27.935294  49.544928  72.911243  142.555556 
cumulative  5  0.001231  0.439645  0.164063  2.161659  6.233524  14.607002  24.314133  54.969697 
periodic      0.287503  0.882510  15.965496  27.951550  48.636612  67.781726  139.500000 
cumulative  6  0.000940  0.422698  0.116298  0.534117  4.837969  12.123443  20.791274  48.581395 
periodic      0.393729  0.963640  15.829859  27.698656  48.480769  70.579545  176.000000 
cumulative  7  0.000834  0.407827  0.075640  0.113930  3.803633  10.217695  18.053308  43.813084 
periodic       0.435650  0.992830  16.071904  28.449848  49.002740  68.743590  157.727273 
 
Table 13.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for each tranche based on a simulation of decreasing forward probability rates of 
an improving portfolio (EVT distribution of portfolio losses). 
 
 
      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
cum./per.  Yr  p   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.769379 
periodic      0.769379 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.251639 
periodic      0.733899 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.019303 
periodic      0.553191 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.881228 
periodic      0.466151 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.787150 
periodic      0.409232 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.717871 
periodic      0.368667 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.663990 
periodic       0.337632 
 
Table 14.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for total amount of tranches based on a simulation of constant forward probability 
rates (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses). 
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      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.765908 
periodic      0.765908 
cumulative  2  0.0036  0.222402 
periodic      0.829289 
cumulative  3  0.0043  0.975792 
periodic      0.619237 
cumulative  4  0.0048  0.831854 
periodic      0.515559 
cumulative  5  0.0051  0.732582 
periodic      0.432518 
cumulative  6  0.0053  0.661370 
periodic      0.383577 
cumulative  7  0.0054  0.606825 
periodic       0.342912 
 
Table 15.  k
j
k
j L L s % %   ratio for total amount of tranches based on a simulation of increasing forward 
probability rates of a deteriorating portfolio (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses). 
 
 
      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
cum./per.  Yr  ru   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
cumulative  1  0.0060  0.046224 
periodic      0.046224 
cumulative  2  0.0050  0.749932 
periodic      0.392634 
cumulative  3  0.0043  0.619890 
periodic      0.284740 
cumulative  4  0.0039  0.542130 
periodic      0.234529 
cumulative  5  0.0036  0.488869 
periodic      0.201697 
cumulative  6  0.0033  0.449901 
periodic      0.176799 
cumulative  7  0.0032  0.419028 
periodic       0.163298 
 
Table 16.  k
j
k
j L L s % %   ratio for total amount of tranches based on a simulation of decreasing forward 
probability rates of an improving portfolio (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses). 
  
  46 
 
 
      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
cum./per.  Yr  p   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.756325 
periodic      0.756325 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.246136 
periodic      0.743383 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.017332 
periodic      0.564103 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.880955 
periodic      0.472713 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.786955 
periodic      0.406006 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.717086 
periodic      0.362818 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.663182 
periodic       0.337617 
 
Table 17.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for total amount of tranches based on a simulation of constant forward probability 
rates (beta distribution of portfolio losses). 
 
 
      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
cum./per.  Yr  p   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.770777 
periodic      0.770777 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.246104 
periodic      0.726054 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.019931 
periodic      0.564341 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.880166 
periodic      0.458705 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.787173 
periodic      0.412451 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.716911 
periodic      0.365571 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.662943 
periodic       0.337481 
 
Table 18.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for total amount of tranches based on a simulation of constant forward probability 
rates (negative binomial distribution of portfolio losses). 
 
 
As shown in Figures A8 and A9, all ratios decrease in time; but the more interesting result is 
that they differ considerably in orders of magnitude. In contrast to the whole portfolio and the 
first loss position [0-2.4%], which yield a ratio of  k
j
k
j L L s % %  in the order of one on the basis of 
cumulative losses, the second tranche [2.4-3.9%] exhibits a  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio of order 10 and the 
remaining, more senior ratios increase roughly by a factor of two on the basis of this reference  
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level. The relationship of periodic expected and unexpected default rates exhibits the second 
moment of a declining impact of s %k
j L
 as the CLO transaction matures. Consequently, it can 
be concluded that the development of expected losses over time are more favourable in the 
case of the first loss piece, but also the variation of unexpected losses around the expected 
value of the most junior tranche retained by the issuer is much lower than for the investor 
tranches, and thus necessitates additional risk premium. Note that by incorporating a normally 
distributed recovery rate (see Appendix, Tables 31-34) the ratio of ratio of  k
j
k
j L L s % %  maintains 
a consistenly higher level than in the previous case without loss recovery. This result indicates 
that close debtor monitoring (proxied by higher loss recovery) could mitigate moral hazards 
effects between the fmost junor tranche and mezzanine and senior tranches. 
 
In general, the obtained results of the term structure of expected and unexpected losses,  %k
j L  
and  s %k
j L
, for a CLO transaction have critical implications on how the security design of 
securitisation transactions has to be viewed in the light of loan default and its variability over 
time. Our results back out the fact that sponsors of CLO transactions, who usually retain the 
most junior tranche as a first loss position in the transaction, find themselves disposed to a 
constant first moment of expected losses (linear increase), while investors holding mezzanine 
(and senior) claims on the collateral portfolio might be discomforted in anticipation of 
exponentially increasing losses.  
 
 
11.2  Comparison with zero-bonds 
 
 
The development of variance in unexpected losses in relation to scheduled defaults of the 
collateral portfolio ( k
j
k
j L L s % %  (unexpected to expected losses) ratio) per period might be indicative of 
the abnormal spreads on CLO tranches, if one was to take risk-neutral returns as the reference 
base. However, as the difference between the observed spreads in the CLO market and the 
calculated risk-neutral spreads depends on the assumptions entering the loss function of credit 
risk, the default rates per tranche and the corresponding risk-neutral spreads should be 
subjected to empirical examination. Since the calculation of expected spreads  on CLO 
tranches rekindles the derivation of the yield-to-maturity of zero-coupon bonds, the term 
structure of periodic default probabilities of selected tranches could be directly benchmarked  
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with comparable zero-bonds, whose internal rate of return is calibrated based on the default 
rates for rating classes published in the rating reports of Moody’s Investor Services. This is 
accomplished by matching the first moments of either the “one-year” default probability 
(“lower boundary”) or the accumulated “seven-year” default probability (“upper boundary”) 
assigned by Moody’s to a suitable corporate bond
13 to the expected loss of the respective CLO 
tranche according to the following scaling: 
 
The bond default rate per period (matched to the one-year-default rate) as lower boundary 
 
  ·
%
%
%
1
1
high
k
Bond
j Bond
L
L
L
  (0.36) 
 
and the bond default rate per period (matched to the seven-year-default rate) as upper 
boundary 
 
  ·
%
%
%
7
7
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k
Bond
j Bond
L
L
L
,  (0.37) 
 
where the exponential growth of default losses allocated to CLO tranches suggest to use the 
high expected loss of a lower rated bond as a matching first moment for the seven-year-
default rate and the low default rate of a higher rated bond as a matching first moment for the 
one-year-default rate. The approximation of default rate patterns of zero-bonds and CLO 
tranches establishes an orientation as to the lower and upper boundaries of the CLO term 
structure if it had the same expected loss properties as zero-bonds. 
 
Thus, the following steps have been completed: 
 
(i)  comparison of default rates of varying rating classes of zero-bonds (Moody’s) and 
the estimated expected default based on NID and EVT distributions  (and 
consideration of deteriorating and improving collateral quality) 
 
                                                 
13 See also Wilson and Fabozzi (1995).  
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(ii)  comparison of calculated spreads (term structure) of zero-bonds and the expected 
return for the different CLO tranches, purely based on risk-neutral returns (and 
consideration of deteriorating and improving collateral quality) 
 
Figures A10 and A11 exhibit matched first moments of the expected losses (default rate term 
structure) of both various rating classes of zero-bonds and the CLO tranches, with Table 19 
illustrating matched first moments of upper and lower boundaries of risk-neutral spreads on 
selected zero-coupon bonds (which have been chosen as close matches in the analysis of the 
default rate term structure in Figures A1-A7). Figures A10 and A11 illustrate the term 
structure of default rates for the first loss position taken by the sponsor [0-2.4%] and the 
“investor tranches” [2.4-3.9%], [3.9-6.5%] and [6.5-9%] for both credit risk loss functions 
(NID and EVT) for a constant forward default rate across seven periods on a cumulative 
basis. The same methodology has been extended for an increasing and decreasing forward 
default rate of an EVT loss function.  
 
Against the background of a particular probability distribution the term structure of a CLO 
tranche is edged by the default term structures of two zero-coupon bonds as upper and lower 
boundary of collateral default. In contrast to zero-bonds, whose periodic default rate increases 
linearly over time, structured default tolerance rises exponentially over time for all tranches 
but the most junior tranche (first loss position) [0-2.4%]. The “investor” tranches display a 
similar degree of convexity for both probability distributions of collateral default, which 
contrasts sharply with the linear (and in some cases concave) increase of cumulative expected 
losses of the first loss provision held by the sponsor of the CLO transaction. 
 
In as far as the previous comparison of default term structures allows for the identification of 
benchmark zero-coupon bonds, the observed difference of risk-neutral returns on CLO 
tranches and suitable zero-coupon bonds (whose spreads have been derived on the basis of 
the same risk-neutral return calculation) reflects the exponential nature of expected losses 
associated with the peculiar loss cascading effect of CLOs as a pars pro toto of structured 
transactions with s ubordination as credit enhancement. Table 20 shows the risk-neutral 
returns of the CLO tranches, whose matching upper and lower boundaries of selected 
benchmark zero-coupon bonds are consistent across different default probability distributions 
of varying forward rates of default. In the case of a constant forward rate simulated risk- 
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neutral returns display the smallest degree of deviation from return expectations for linearly 
increasing cumulative defaults of zero-coupon bonds, where the EVT distribution makes a 
strong bid for attention as it commands higher spreads than the NID default probability 
distribution for the first loss position [0-2.4%] and the most senior “investor tranche” [6.5-
9%]. It has to be noted that the bond spreads do not attract reference as a first moment match 
with the CLO tranches as opposed to the “matched comparison” the term structure of default 
rates between zero-coupon bonds and CLO tranches.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19. Risk-neutral returns on zero-coupon bonds given their default term structure (Moody’s Investor 
Services), matched with the CLO tranches in first moment in either the first or seventh period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Comparison of risk-neutral returns of CLO tranches for different distributions of credit loss on a 
cumulative basis with a constant, increasing and decreasing forward rate of default.  
cum. (EVT/const.) 20.34747% 6.28610% 5.25952% 5.06849% 5.03000% 5.00140%
cum. (NID/const.) 20.56017% 6.79431% 5.33870% 5.05067% 5.01100% 5.00010%
cum. (EVT/deter.) 37.49613% 10.81930% 5.69241% 5.11364% 5.03970% 5.00160%
cum. (NID/deter.) 30.43862% 10.19510% 6.78903% 5.39333% 5.10090% 5.00120%
cum. (EVT/improv.) 49.12123% 9.87893% 5.60218% 5.10820% 5.03820% 5.00150%
cum. (NID/improv.) 42.75610% 10.94410% 6.00440% 5.06577% 5.00640% 5.00000%
Improving
Deteriorating
Constant 
6.73539% 
(Ba2)
Benchmark Zero Bonds
Returns per Tranche Distribution and Collateral Performance
6.10601% 
(Ba1)
5.05892% 
(A1)
upper bound 
lower bound 10.33656% 
(B3)
5.16282% 
(A3)
5.03278% 
(Aa3)
20.15625% 
(Caa)
5.35818% 
(Baa2)
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
Moody's 
rating
Zero bond returns 
per rating class
CLO benchmark
(for a constant risk-free 
interest rate of 5%)
Aaa 5.00074%
Aa1 5.00771%
Aa2 5.01596%
Aa3 5.03278% upper bound Tranche 4
A1 5.05892% upper bound Tranche 4
A2 5.10357%
A3 5.16282% upper bound Tranche 3
Baa1 5.24663%
Baa2 5.35818% lower bound Tranche 3 & Tranche 4
Baa3 5.65911%
Ba3 6.10601% upper bound Tranche 2
B1 6.73539% lower bound Tranche 2
B2 7.47054%
B3 8.41114%
Caa 9.52890% 
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12  INTRODUCTION OF STOCHASTIC RISK-FREE INTEREST 
RATES 
 
 
In simulation of the interest rate 
l f r , we need to distinguish between two cases: (i) a variable 
(stochastic) risk-free interest rate based on the fitted distribution of observed LIBOR rates 
and (ii) a constant risk-free rate, which is the average value of the stochastic interest rate 
across time. In this section we allow for a varying risk-free interest rate per period. Due to the 
egression of the United Kingdom from the European exchange rate system (European 
Monetary System (EMS)) on 16.09.1992 (JORION, 2001),
14 we restrict the database of interest 
rates to 12-month LIBOR rates quoted at t he daily market’s closing from 04.00.1993 to 
02.10.2001 in order to avoid a “change point” in the time series of observed daily interest 
rates.
15 The observed data points do not display significant historical bias (“momentum 
effect”) and heteroscedasticity is low, such that they can be safely regarded independent and 
identically distributed. Since only the first 1,000 observations contain 460 zero returns, the 
simulation of stochastic interest rates for the given investment horizon in the presented model 
requires the transformation of daily LIBOR rates to end-of-the week quotes. This 
methodology does not harm the statistical validity of extrapolating future interest rates, as the 
intra-week rates do not fluctuate, so that a particular end-of-week effect of daily 12-month 
LIBOR rates can be confidently ruled out. After this conversion of daily rates will are still left 
with 447 observations to substantiate the simulation. 
 
12.1  Interest Rate Model 
 
 
Generally speaking, interest rate models focus on extrapolating the development of returns on 
fixed income securities in relation to their maturity. The most common approach would 
assume one or more factors to explain the interest rate term structure. After the time-varying 
dynamics of a single- or multi-factor model have been specified the imposition of certain 
                                                 
14 One could also argue in favour of using observations only after the December 1995 Madrid Summit, mainly 
because it was then that a concrete timetable for the introduction of the euro was agreed upon and much of the 
detailed preparatory work was set in motion. At this point in time, some have argued, the convergence process of 
European monetary policy commences, as the implications of the 1992 ERM crisis gradually began to be offset 
by visible evidence of practical advances in the introducing the euro. 
15 This starting date of the time series was chosen insofar as some time is needed for the event (Great Britain left 
the European Monetary System (EMS) on 16th September 1992) to manifest itself in the new model.  
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expectation hypotheses yields an explicit result for future interest rates. Thus, we employ the 
interest rate model proposed by Hull and White (HULL, 1993): 
 
  [ ] qs =-+ ln()ln drtardtdz   (0.38) 
 
Since the model considers logarithmic interest rates  ln dr  instead of nominal  r , we guard 
against negative interest rates that might arise in the course of the analysis. Moreover, mean 
reversion is permitted for  > 0 a . We substitute the constant  m  for the term structure 
parameter q() t , given that the objective of this exercise is predicated on the simulation of the 
12-month interest rate at a certain point rather than an entire yield curve. The conversion of 
this discretisation yields a AR(1) process with  > 0 a : 
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where we abstain from imposing normality on the independent, uniformly distributed values 
of  t e , because no option prices are determined in the course of this analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3. The time series of logarithmic end-of-week LIBOR interest rates 
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The plot of logarithmic end-of-week LIBOR interest rates exhibits only a weak form of mean 
reversion, since it takes about two years on average until the level of LIBOR rates has 
returned to the original base level. Consequently, the time series of the returns of 12-month 
LIBOR rates  
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is at the brink of non-stationarity, given the weak mean reversion of the LIBOR time series on 
almost nine years of historic data results in an a  value close to 0. We use maximum likelihood 
estimation to determine the parameters of the probability distribution of AR(1) residuals of 
logarithmic interest rates.  
 
Due to the weak mean reversion of the given LIBOR rates the ML estimation proves to be 
inconclusive even with the YULE WALKER starting estimator. We have left the matter at the 
robust YULE WALKER estimator a ˆ  for a . The results are illustrated in Table 21 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21. Yule Walker estimation results for mean reversion. 
 
 
The residuals  a - =- 1 ˆ lnln ttt Rrr  are clearly heavy tailed, as the deviation of a line signifying the 
empirical quantiles against standard normal quantiles in the Q -Q plot (Fig. 4) below 
demonstrates.  
parameter
estimator 0.977686 0.022314
std. error 0.027836 0.027836
t-value 35.12 0.80
ˆ a ˆ a 
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Figure 4. Q-Q plot of observed distribution of LIBOR rates and a standard normal distribution. 
 
 
Nonetheless, the tails, i.e. the positive and negative deviation of the observed distribution of 
LIBOR rates from a standard normal distribution, appear to be symmetric, we have fitted a t-
distribution on the mean-adjusted and scaled residuals of the observed data points
16, such that  
 
  n msee =+ : for. ttt Rt   (0.41) 
 
At this point one could certainly consider more advanced interest rate models, such as the 
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model (1985). In the CIR model
17 we would assume  t R  to be the 
                                                 
16 See also CAMPELL AND MACKINLAY (1997); SANDMANN (1999). 
17 The CIR model assumes  ( ) T Pt  to be the price of a zero bond with a nominal value set to 1, i.e. a non-dividend 
paying security, which pays exactly 1 at maturity T. The so-called “yield-to-maturity (YTM)”  ( ) T Yt  denotes the 
logarithmic return of the zero bond at continuous compounding of interest, such that the relationship between 
the bond price and its investment return is  ( ) ( ) { } t =- exp TT PtYt  for the remaining maturity  t =- Tt . The short 
rate is defined as  ( ) ( )
ﬁ
= lim T
Tt
rtYt  and is considered the most important estimator value of the interest rate term 
structure. Since  ( ) rt represents the sport rate at the limit for  ﬁ Tt , the expected price of the zero bond at time t 
is  ( ) ( )
Øø ￿￿
Œœ ￿￿ =-W
￿￿ Œœ Łł ºß ￿
exp
T
Tt
t
PtErsds  for a variable but deterministic interest rate and past prices  Wt . Thus,  ( ) T Pt  
represents the present value of a zero bond over its lifetime with a constant return rate of  ( ) T Yt  or repeated 
investment in zero bonds in future periods  -1,..., tT  at a risky short-term rate. The CIR model includes the short-
term interest rate as a factor (as most one-factor models), whose dynamics is specified as a time-continuous 
stochastic process  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s =-+ t drtabrtdtrtdW , with a Wiener process  t W  and constant parameters a,b and s .  
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price of a zero bond  ( ) T Pt  with a nominal value set to 1, i.e. a non-dividend paying security, 
which pays exactly 1 at maturity T. We include the short-term interest rate as a factor (as most 
one-factor models), whose dynamics is specified as a time-continuous stochastic process  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s =-+ , t drtabrtdtrtdW   (0.42) 
 
with a Wiener process  t W  and constant parameters a,b and s . The volatility  ( ) s rtincreases 
in the interest rate level, and  ( ) rt is specified as a Markov process, such that  ( ) T Pt  becomes a 
function of the current short-term rate
18,  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) = ,. T PtVrtt  (0.43) 
 
Thus, the complete CIR model reads as  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ==-+- ,exp, T PtVrttATtBTTrt   (0.44) 
 
where  
 
  ys =+
22 2 a   (0.45) 
 
and  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } tyyyt =++- 2exp1, ga   (0.46) 
 
such that 
 
  ( )
( ) { }
( )
t
yy
t
t s
+
= 2
2exp
2 2 ln
a
ab
A
g
  (0.47) 
 
 
and 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
The volatility  ( ) s rt increases in the interest rate level, and  ( ) rt is specified as a Markov process, such that 
( ) T Pt  becomes a function of the current short-term rate,  ( ) ( ) ( ) = , T PtVrtt. We consider the Wiener process 
mean reverting as a positive value for a offsets any deviation from the stationary mean value b. By using Itos 
Lemma we obtain the differential equation  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s
¶¶ ¶
-++-=
¶¶ ¶
2
2
2
,, (,)1
,0
2
VrtVrt Vrt
abrrrVrt
rt r
 with the 
boundary condition  ( ) ( ) == ,1 T VrTPT . This set of equations yields the above CIR model (eq. 0.37). 
18 See also  DUFFIE (1997);  KARATZAS AND  SHREVE (1991);  WILMOTT, H OWISON AND  DEWYNNE (1995); 
BENNINGA (1997).  
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  ( )
( ) { }
( )
yt
t
t
-
=
21exp
B
g
.
19  (0.48) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Q-Q plot of observed residuals and t-distribution 
 
 
The estimated parameters for the 12-month LIBOR interest rate are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Estimation of residuals for a fitted t-distribution on 12-month LIBOR  
 
 
The estimated chi-square statistic  c
2
19  is 24.52, which equates to a p-value of 17.69%. 
                                                 
19 The interest rate term structure, i.e. the yield-to-maturity, converges to 
y
=
+
lim
2ab
Y
a
 as the remaining maturity 
- Tt  becomes larger. If the short-term interest rate  ( ) > rtb , the first moment of the interest rate term structure is 
negative, whereas  ( )< lim rtYindicates rising future interest rates. If the short-term interest rate is  ( ) << lim brtY, 
the yield curve could increase before a negative second moment induces declining interest rate in the long-term. 
estimator 0.040622 0.011517 2643781
std. error 0.000674 0.000791 0.419292
t-value 60.26 14.55 3.92
ˆ m ˆ s ˆ n 
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12.2  Simulation 
 
We simulate one million paths of estimated LIBOR interest rates over seven years, i.e. 350 
time increments, based on the presented model. Figure 6 is an exemplary exposition of a few 
paths. 
 
 
Figure 6. Simulation of LIBOR rates following HULL AND WHITE (1993) 
 
 
Table 23 below shows the estimated spreads per tranche investors ought to demand, if 
stochastic risk-free interest rates (12-month LIBOR) averaged over one million 
 iterations of 
the suggested interest rate model are applied to the risk-neutral pricing of CLOs (eq. 0.19). 
Analogous to the pervious section, when a constant risk-free rate of 5.0% is used, spreads are 
calculated for both models of credit risk (EVT and NID) and three possibilities of portfolio 
quality (constant, deteriorating, improving). For illustrative purposes investor spreads per 
tranche have also been calculated with the average stochastic interest-rate (Tab. 24) as the 
constant risk-free rate  
 
 
m ￿￿ = ￿￿
Łł
exp6.174769%
a
  (0.49) 
 
In the case of a fixed risk-free rate (see Section 8), we have maximised the discount factor 
( ) 1 1
l
m
f l r
= + ￿  with the summation of risk-free interest rates 
l f r  per period held constant, such  
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that 
1 ll ff rr
+ = . In this section stochastic interest rates are introduced. Even though the 
summation of stochastic interest rates per period j equates to the summation of constant risk-
free interest rates  ( ) 1 1
l
m
f l r
= + ￿  due to mean reversion for  ﬁ¥ t  in general and  ﬁ¥ m  in our 
model, stochastic interest rates vary over time, such that 
+ „
1 ll ff rr . Thus, if we substitute 
stochastic periodic interest rates for the constant risk-free interest rates 
l f r ,  ( ) = + ￿ 1 1
l
m
f l r  is 
generally smaller for stochastic interest rates than for constant interest rates. If we recapitulate 
the term structure of default rates for each tranche of a CLO transaction (eq. 0.19), the risk-
neutral spreads need to be lower for stochastic interest rates to offset a smaller value in the 
denominator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23. Expected spreads per tranche based on the average variable (stochastic) risk-free rate as constant 
discount rate   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24. Expected spreads per tranche based on the periodic stochastic/variable risk-free rate   
 
 
 
However, the effect of variable (stochastic) interest rates is not only confined to a lower level 
of spreads investors will demand in return for periodic defaults in each tranche. The 
cum. (EVT/const.) 22.39463% 7.30974% 6.29268% 6.10283% 6.06451% 6.03589%
cum. (NID/const.) 20.62188% 7.81517% 6.37059% 6.08477% 6.04547% 6.03454%
cum. (EVT/deter.) 38.26656% 10.74418% 6.71721% 6.14718% 6.07401% 6.03609%
cum. (NID/deter.) 30.38123% 12.15254% 7.79993% 6.42232% 6.13398% 6.03570%
cum. (EVT/improv.) 50.15165% 10.84695% 6.63082% 6.14206% 6.07255% 6.03599%
cum. (NID/improv.) 43.89018% 10.92903% 6.92431% 6.09964% 6.04086% 6.03446%
Distribution and Collateral Performance Returns per Tranche (at avg. stochastic risk-free rate)
Constant 
Deteriorating
Improving
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
cum. (EVT/const.) 22.62031% 7.45478% 6.43406% 6.24347% 6.20499% 6.17623%
cum. (NID/const.) 20.84458% 7.96229% 6.51219% 6.22531% 6.18585% 6.17488%
cum. (EVT/deter.) 38.56835% 10.90002% 6.85962% 6.28793% 6.21451% 6.17644%
cum. (NID/deter.) 30.65209% 12.31435% 7.94590% 6.56384% 6.27462% 6.17605%
cum. (EVT/improv.) 50.54813% 10.00315% 6.77326% 6.28283% 6.21305% 6.17634%
cum. (NID/improv.) 44.25293% 12.09255% 7.06783% 6.24022% 6.18122% 6.17480%
Returns per Tranche (at variable risk-free rate)
Constant 
Deteriorating
Improving
Distribution and Collateral Performance
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L
%k
j L 
  59 
 
implications of a lower periodic discount rate  ( ) = + ￿ 1 1
l
m
f l r  will be more pronounced the 
more time has elapsed in a CLO transaction. This has a significant bearing on the different 
term structures of default rates of the first loss position (constant expected losses per period) 
and the “investor tranches” (non-linear increase of expected losses per period). The 
interaction of term structures and stochastic interest rates means that spreads for the first loss 
position will decline to a higher extent than for mezzanine and senior tranches as we permit 
the periodic discount rate  ( ) = + ￿ 1 1
l
m
f l r  to vary across time by a introducing stochastic risk-
free interest rate. 
 
 
12.3  Economic explanation 
 
 
Since we benchmark the term structure of default for each tranche of the CLO transaction to 
comparable zero bonds, we might resort to the pricing behaviour of bonds to explain the 
difference of spreads between constant and stochastic risk-free interest rates. As the intrinsic 
value of volatility in time-varying interest rates induce a higher bond price than constant 
interest rates, investment in bonds is s afer under a constant discount rate per period. 
Consequently, a constant interest rate leads to a marginal increase of the periodic discount 
rate ( ) 1 1
l
m
f l r
= + ￿ , which requires higher investment spreads according to equation 0.19. Thus, 
the calculated spreads of each tranche ought to be lower for stochastic interest rates than 
under constant interest rates.  
 
 
13  CONCLUSION  – MODELLING THE LOSS FUNCTION AND 
LOSS CASCADING 
 
 
The presented analysis purposted to a comprehensive illustration of loan securitisation from 
the perspective of the default term structure and the pricing of CLO tranches. We base our 
methodology on divergent loss accumulation of tranches of debt securities issued on loan 
portfolios due to the priorisation of cumulative loan loss most commonly found in  
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subordinated structures of securitisations. This so-called loss cascading mechanism was 
modelled by transforming simulating uniformly distributed periodic (annual) random portfolio 
losses into two prime cumulative distributions, an (i) extreme value theory loss function and a 
(ii) normal inverse distribution function. Furthermore both a beta distribution as well as a 
negative binomial distribution of loan default augment this determination of default term 
structures in comparative terms. The simulation was augmented by also taking into 
consideration normally distributed loss recovery. By virtue of a reality check on the tranche 
pricing for the simulations results of portfolio loss assumed accurate we privilege equally 
concerns about contingencies of estimation risk and state variable uncertainty, on the one 
hand, and the economic virtues of viable and realistic model specification, on the other hand. 
 
We identified a dichotomy of estimated losses per tranche between the first loss position and 
the “investors tranches”. Whereas the term structure of cumulative loan loss increase linearly 
with respect to the first tranche, the remaining tranches are subjected to an exponentially 
increasing loss burden and follow a convex term structure. The latter aspect translates into 
excess spreads for tranches issued to investors, as the pricing of the transaction on the 
grounds of risk-neutral default-probabilities corresponds to a more convex term structure 
compared to corporate bonds with the same average life and similar rating. This observation is 
underpinned by the relevance of the variance of default losses (cf.  s % %
k
j
k
j L L  ratio), whose 
impact on estimated investor returns increases exponentially for tranches beyond the first loss 
position. Considering the structural features of securitisation transactions this result bears 
critical relevance to any model of securitisation in the context of asymmetric information as 
the issuer is compelled to retain a portion of the low risk loan category for the market to 
remain in equilibrium ex ceteris paribus. Consequently, the retention of the lowest tranche 
eventuates not only enhanced calibration of measures to manage credit risk exposure but also 
the transfer of additional risks and higher variance of loss severity to investors. Given the high 
level of cumulative probability (stochastic weight) associated with extreme events in the case 
of the extreme value theory loss function, its approximation of extreme type behaviour of 
credit losses is superior to the tail behaviour of the normal inverse distribution as well as the 
beta- and negative binomial distribution, which shows almost perfect coincidence of 
probability masses. It warrants noting that extreme value theory improves on the modelling of 
default risk by means of the normal inverse distribution as the variance of unexpected loss in  
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relation to scheduled defaults in the collateral portfolio is significantly reduced, while most 
losses accrue to the first loss credit default cover of the most junior tranche. Nonetheless, 
even if approximating portfolio performance across time depends on the chosen loss 
function, the effect of loss cascading remains to be consistently most pronounced in the first 
loss position across all distributions. As opposed to the beta- and negative-binomial 
distribution, which yield a significantly higher estimated risk exposure of the CLO tranches 
after the respective parameters have been calibrated by matching the first two moments, the 
extreme value theory loss function concentrates an escalation of expected cumulative losses 
on the most junior tranche (especially if the forward rate is flexible as to reflect time-varying 
collateral portfolio quality), whilst marginal periodic losses display asymptotic properties. The 
implications of variable portfolio quality on the cumulative and periodic loss burden per 
tranche reinforce the conclusion that the partial retention of assets of the collateral pool does 
not only reflect adverse effects of information asymmetries in the securitisation market. Bank 
issuers also have the ability to subdivide and redirect cash flows from underlying assets among 
a range of sold and retained interests in order to reduce their total risk exposure in linear 
future default and to enhance tranche spreads allocated to investors. Given this structural 
discretion in security design on part of issuers, the management of unexpected risk represents 
the decisive element in the selection of the securitised loans, i.e. the credit risk of the collateral 
portfolio. 
 
Since 60 to 95 % (depending on the modelled loss function of the loan portfolio) of the 
default loss is concentrated in the first loss position (whose level is subject to the willingness 
of the issuer to provide credit cover), the aforementioned incentives for securitisation persist, 
recent financial innovation in the area of loan securitisation has drawn increased attention to 
the possibility of subparticipation.
20 
                                                 
20 The mechanism of interest subparticipation has been devised by issuers to reduce the illiquidity of the first loss 
piece of securitisation transactions in order to ameliorate the marketability of the credit enhancement held by the 
sponsor of the transaction as an equity tranche. Payments out of available interest generated from the overall 
reference portfolio are partially used to offset first losses of noteholders of the first loss position. By doing so, 
the principal amount of the outstanding first loss piece is reduced through the amount of interest 
subparticipation, in an amount equal to the allocated realised losses. Even though the claim of first loss 
noteholders to the interest subparticipation is an unsecured claim against the issuer, the economic rationale 
behind this concept is regulatory capital relief, as no capital has to be held against interest income under the 
current regulatory standards. Since the first loss piece achieves the rating of the issuer, the placement of credit 
enhancement under interest subparticipation is cost efficient. However, the capital efficiency derived from such 
an arrangement is associated with substantial institutional risk i n view of potential future changes in the 
regulatory framework, which has hitherto not given clear guidance on the capital treatment of the concept of  
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Despite of regulatory change (“internal ratings-based approach”), which renders obsolete 
efforts of institutional arbitrage between minimum capital requirements and economic capital 
associated with a certain risk category of loans, the continuous presence of exogenous non-
systematic risk warrants limiting the impact of unexpected risk. Once linear expected losses 
allocated to the credit enhancement are accounted for by means of the security design, the 
benefit of the securitisation process derives from the removal of unexpected losses from the 
bank loan book, provided that possible efficiency loss due to adverse selection in the 
securitisation of illiquid loans matches the remedial effect of the credit enhancement. The 
lower the error margin of modelled periodic credit losses the more accurate risk-neutral 
calculation of tranche spreads will be. With the gap between risk-neutral spreads and observed 
prices of CLO tranches gradually narrowing as we estimate a reduction of unexpected loss in 
proportion to unexpected loss of the securitisation transaction, the model predictions militate 
towards CLO pricing in efficient markets. Nonetheless, the significant decline of marginal 
unexpected losses over time in the first loss position held by the issuer/sponsor of the 
transaction allows issuers more predictable investment risk than capital market investors, who 
hold the mezzanine and senior tranches (investor tranches). In view of inherent 
intransparency of actual asset quality in current CLO markets (especially in bank-based 
financial systems), an extension of this approach to unexpected loss is instrumental in 
estimating the term structure of CLOs in a sufficiently liquidity market for bank loans. 
Therefore, a consideration of integrating sophisticated derivative structures and 
comprehensive asset pricing methods in the security design of CLOs will further common 
understanding of the term structure and the pricing of CLO transactions. 
                                                                                                                                                    
interest subparticipation in the provision of credit enhancement. The new proposal for a revision of the Basel 
Accord indicates the possibility that the fist loss position will most likely be subjected to a full deduction from 
capital in this thinly regulated area of structured finance. Given present regulatory uncertainty as to the future 
capital treatment o f structural provisions, such credit enhancement and the interest subparticipation, it is 
worthwhile incorporating a regulatory call of the first loss piece, which allows for the possible restructuring and 
subsequent sale of the most junior tranche to capital market investors.  
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15  APPENDIX  
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010  0.002503  0.000046  0.000026  0.000009  0.000005  0.000009 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010  0.002503  0.000046  0.000026  0.000009  0.000005  0.000009 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005299  0.006512  0.207327  0.007653  0.002229  0.000797  0.000402  0.000023  0.004976  0.000115  0.000058  0.000020  0.000010  0.000020 
periodic      0.002701  0.001931  0.103042  0.004558  0.001242  0.000422  0.000214  0.000013  0.002473  0.000068  0.000032  0.000011  0.000005  0.000012 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007799  0.007978  0.308168  0.014546  0.003940  0.001332  0.000648  0.000037  0.007396  0.000218  0.000102  0.000033  0.000016  0.000033 
periodic      0.002500  0.001466  0.100841  0.006893  0.001711  0.000535  0.000246  0.000014  0.002420  0.000103  0.000044  0.000013  0.000006  0.000012 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010397  0.009228  0.406098  0.024665  0.006204  0.001994  0.000952  0.000051  0.009746  0.000370  0.000161  0.000050  0.000024  0.000045 
periodic      0.002598  0.001250  0.097930  0.010119  0.002264  0.000662  0.000304  0.000014  0.002350  0.000152  0.000059  0.000017  0.000008  0.000012 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012990  0.010317  0.500079  0.039278  0.009131  0.002777  0.001292  0.000067  0.012002  0.000589  0.000237  0.000069  0.000032  0.000059 
periodic      0.002593  0.001089  0.093981  0.014613  0.002927  0.000783  0.000340  0.000016  0.002256  0.000219  0.000076  0.000020  0.000009  0.000014 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015581  0.011252  0.589083  0.060005  0.012995  0.003645  0.001649  0.000082  0.014138  0.000900  0.000338  0.000091  0.000041  0.000073 
periodic      0.002591  0.000935  0.089004  0.020727  0.003864  0.000868  0.000357  0.000015  0.002136  0.000311  0.000100  0.000022  0.000009  0.000013 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018168  0.012104  0.671323  0.088676  0.018083  0.004711  0.002052  0.000098  0.016112  0.001330  0.000470  0.000118  0.000051  0.000087 
periodic        0.002587  0.000852  0.082240  0.028671  0.005088  0.001066  0.000403  0.000016  0.001974  0.000430  0.000132  0.000027  0.000010  0.000014 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  s %k
j L per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526  0.003143  0.000755  0.000734  0.000451  0.000325  0.001351 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526  0.003143  0.000755  0.000734  0.000451  0.000325  0.001351 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005299  0.006512  0.178268  0.078295  0.041886  0.026340  0.019017  0.002261  0.004278  0.001174  0.001089  0.000659  0.000475  0.002001 
periodic      0.002701  0.001931  0.047327  0.027958  0.013639  0.008308  0.006004  0.000735  0.001136  0.000419  0.000355  0.000208  0.000150  0.000650 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007799  0.007978  0.208257  0.106408  0.055182  0.033976  0.024088  0.002737  0.004998  0.001596  0.001435  0.000849  0.000602  0.002422 
periodic      0.002500  0.001466  0.029989  0.028113  0.013296  0.007636  0.005071  0.000476  0.000720  0.000422  0.000346  0.000191  0.000127  0.000421 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010397  0.009228  0.226551  0.136470  0.068699  0.041584  0.029081  0.003191  0.005437  0.002047  0.001786  0.001040  0.000727  0.002824 
periodic      0.002598  0.001250  0.018294  0.030062  0.013517  0.007608  0.004993  0.000454  0.000439  0.000451  0.000351  0.000190  0.000125  0.000402 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012990  0.010317  0.235359  0.169272  0.082556  0.048863  0.033732  0.003616  0.005649  0.002539  0.002146  0.001222  0.000843  0.003200 
periodic      0.002593  0.001089  0.008808  0.032802  0.013857  0.007279  0.004651  0.000425  0.000211  0.000492  0.000360  0.000182  0.000116  0.000376 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015581  0.011252  0.235536  0.205001  0.097288  0.055601  0.038068  0.003977  0.005653  0.003075  0.002529  0.001390  0.000952  0.003520 
periodic      0.002591  0.000935  0.000177  0.035729  0.014732  0.006738  0.004336  0.000361  0.000004  0.000536  0.000383  0.000168  0.000108  0.000319 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018168  0.012104  0.227853  0.243130  0.113521  0.062720  0.042430  0.004301  0.005468  0.003647  0.002952  0.001568  0.001061  0.003806 
periodic        0.002587  0.000852  -0.007683  0.038129  0.016233  0.007119  0.004362  0.000324  -0.000184  0.000572  0.000422  0.000178  0.000109  0.000287 
 
Table 25. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (extreme value theory loss function as distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses 
on a cumulative and periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.  
  ii 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00010  0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010  0.002503  0.000046  0.000026  0.000009  0.000005  0.000009 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.104285  0.003095  0.000987  0.000375  0.000188  0.000010  0.002503  0.000046  0.000026  0.000009  0.000005  0.000009 
cumulative  2  0.00123  0.006191  0.006508  0.248098  0.008190  0.002382  0.000833  0.000413  0.000023  0.005954  0.000123  0.000062  0.000021  0.000010  0.000020 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.145561  0.003188  0.001032  0.000366  0.000197  0.000012  0.003452  0.000076  0.000036  0.000011  0.000006  0.000012 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.010473  0.007834  0.416846  0.018131  0.004431  0.001373  0.000653  0.000034  0.010004  0.000272  0.000115  0.000034  0.000016  0.000030 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.174498  0.003318  0.000946  0.000311  0.000158  0.000009  0.004050  0.000149  0.000053  0.000014  0.000006  0.000010 
cumulative  4  0.00247  0.015278  0.009016  0.598044  0.039707  0.007968  0.002189  0.000976  0.000049  0.014353  0.000596  0.000207  0.000055  0.000024  0.000043 
periodic      0.004805  0.004461  0.196124  0.003444  0.000979  0.000336  0.000171  0.000010  0.004349  0.000324  0.000092  0.000020  0.000008  0.000013 
cumulative  5  0.00277  0.020389  0.010101  0.770975  0.088717  0.014413  0.003391  0.001416  0.000068  0.018503  0.001331  0.000375  0.000085  0.000035  0.000060 
periodic      0.005111  0.004540  0.208625  0.003570  0.001030  0.000365  0.000192  0.000011  0.004150  0.000735  0.000168  0.000030  0.000011  0.000017 
cumulative  6  0.00295  0.025679  0.011100  0.908023  0.195662  0.026506  0.005249  0.002007  0.000091  0.021793  0.002935  0.000689  0.000131  0.000050  0.000081 
periodic      0.005289  0.004583  0.215965  0.003606  0.001061  0.000374  0.000194  0.000012  0.003289  0.001604  0.000314  0.000046  0.000015  0.000020 
cumulative  7  0.00306  0.031064  0.011904  0.981059  0.389878  0.049962  0.008072  0.002774  0.000114  0.023545  0.005848  0.001299  0.000202  0.000069  0.000101 
periodic        0.005386  0.004303  0.220174  0.003614  0.001051  0.000347  0.000173  0.000008  0.001753  0.002913  0.000610  0.000071  0.000019  0.000020 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  s %k
j L per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00010  0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526  0.003143  0.000755  0.000734  0.000451  0.000325  0.001351 
periodic      0.002598  0.004581  0.130941  0.050337  0.028247  0.018032  0.013013  0.001526  0.003143  0.000755  0.000734  0.000451  0.000325  0.001351 
cumulative  2  0.00123  0.006191  0.006508  0.174874  0.080581  0.043399  0.026735  0.019296  0.002297  0.004197  0.001209  0.001128  0.000668  0.000482  0.002033 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.128459  0.050898  0.028846  0.017801  0.013353  0.001674  0.001054  0.000454  0.000394  0.000218  0.000157  0.000682 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.010473  0.007834  0.196178  0.116936  0.058216  0.034156  0.024201  0.002717  0.004708  0.001754  0.001514  0.000854  0.000605  0.002405 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.127236  0.051448  0.027190  0.016506  0.011817  0.001324  0.000511  0.000545  0.000385  0.000186  0.000123  0.000372 
cumulative  4  0.00247  0.015278  0.009016  0.195799  0.166620  0.076333  0.042914  0.029468  0.003226  0.004699  0.002499  0.001985  0.001073  0.000737  0.002855 
periodic      0.004805  0.004461  0.126626  0.052496  0.027589  0.017024  0.012409  0.001539  -0.000009  0.000745  0.000471  0.000219  0.000132  0.000450 
cumulative  5  0.00277  0.020389  0.010101  0.168668  0.234645  0.100094  0.052945  0.035368  0.003746  0.004048  0.003520  0.002602  0.001324  0.000884  0.003315 
periodic      0.005111  0.004540  0.126135  0.053353  0.028524  0.017735  0.013319  0.001588  -0.000651  0.001020  0.000618  0.000251  0.000148  0.000460 
cumulative  6  0.00295  0.025679  0.011100  0.113185  0.312582  0.131249  0.065124  0.041864  0.004305  0.002716  0.004689  0.003412  0.001628  0.001047  0.003810 
periodic      0.005289  0.004583  0.125604  0.053776  0.028916  0.018047  0.013306  0.001701  -0.001332  0.001169  0.000810  0.000304  0.000162  0.000495 
cumulative  7  0.00306  0.031064  0.011904  0.048280  0.358264  0.172091  0.079550  0.048750  0.004631  0.001159  0.005374  0.004474  0.001989  0.001219  0.004098 
periodic        0.005386  0.004303  0.125246  0.053700  0.028669  0.017346  0.012474  0.001050  -0.001558  0.000685  0.001062  0.000361  0.000172  0.000289 
 
Table 26. Simulation of increasing forward probability rates (extreme value theory loss function as distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses 
on a cumulative and periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base. 
  
  iii 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00367  0.006005  0.004523  0.245673  0.003844  0.001091  0.000378  0.000182  0.000009  0.005896  0.000058  0.000028  0.000009  0.000005  0.000008 
periodic      0.006005  0.004523  0.245673  0.003844  0.001091  0.000378  0.000182  0.000009  0.005896  0.000058  0.000028  0.000009  0.000005  0.000008 
cumulative  2  0.00267  0.011014  0.006328  0.445650  0.012637  0.003011  0.000892  0.000419  0.000020  0.010696  0.000190  0.000078  0.000022  0.000010  0.000018 
periodic      0.005009  0.004429  0.204375  0.003659  0.001085  0.000360  0.000178  0.000009  0.004799  0.000132  0.000050  0.000013  0.000006  0.000010 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.015296  0.007696  0.608457  0.030299  0.005900  0.001564  0.000693  0.000032  0.014603  0.000454  0.000153  0.000039  0.000017  0.000028 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.174498  0.003318  0.000946  0.000311  0.000158  0.000009  0.003907  0.000265  0.000075  0.000017  0.000007  0.000011 
cumulative  4  0.00154  0.019189  0.008889  0.742734  0.063996  0.010507  0.002531  0.001046  0.000047  0.017826  0.000960  0.000273  0.000063  0.000026  0.000042 
periodic      0.003894  0.004440  0.158171  0.003325  0.001020  0.000345  0.000169  0.000009  0.003223  0.000505  0.000120  0.000024  0.000009  0.000013 
cumulative  5  0.00123  0.022782  0.010016  0.846424  0.121583  0.017450  0.003799  0.001493  0.000066  0.020314  0.001824  0.000454  0.000095  0.000037  0.000058 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.145561  0.003188  0.001032  0.000366  0.000197  0.000012  0.002489  0.000864  0.000181  0.000032  0.000011  0.000017 
cumulative  6  0.00094  0.026099  0.011032  0.917378  0.206659  0.027686  0.005460  0.002017  0.000086  0.022017  0.003100  0.000720  0.000137  0.000050  0.000076 
periodic      0.003317  0.004623  0.134103  0.003262  0.001042  0.000364  0.000176  0.000010  0.001703  0.001276  0.000266  0.000042  0.000013  0.000018 
cumulative  7  0.00083  0.029309  0.011953  0.961671  0.318082  0.042558  0.007584  0.002645  0.000107  0.023080  0.004771  0.001107  0.000190  0.000066  0.000095 
periodic        0.003209  0.004607  0.129703  0.003157  0.000987  0.000365  0.000195  0.000011  0.001063  0.001671  0.000387  0.000053  0.000016  0.000019 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
s %k
j L per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  s %k
j L per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.00367  0.006005  0.004523  0.124453  0.055172  0.029266  0.018088  0.012631  0.001715  0.002987  0.000828  0.000761  0.000452  0.000316  0.001518 
periodic      0.006005  0.004523  0.124453  0.055172  0.029266  0.018088  0.012631  0.001715  0.002987  0.000828  0.000761  0.000452  0.000316  0.001518 
cumulative  2  0.00267  0.011014  0.006328  0.159532  0.097505  0.047893  0.027566  0.019229  0.002198  0.003829  0.001463  0.001245  0.000689  0.000481  0.001945 
periodic      0.005009  0.004429  0.126442  0.054316  0.029122  0.017752  0.012535  0.001253  0.000842  0.000635  0.000484  0.000237  0.000165  0.000427 
cumulative  3  0.00195  0.015296  0.007696  0.170597  0.145666  0.065797  0.036069  0.024743  0.002656  0.004094  0.002185  0.001711  0.000902  0.000619  0.002351 
periodic      0.004282  0.004366  0.127236  0.051448  0.027190  0.016506  0.011817  0.001324  0.000266  0.000722  0.000466  0.000213  0.000138  0.000405 
cumulative  4  0.00154  0.019189  0.008889  0.162596  0.202429  0.086183  0.045515  0.030438  0.003059  0.003902  0.003036  0.002241  0.001138  0.000761  0.002707 
periodic      0.003894  0.004440  0.128220  0.051941  0.028494  0.017093  0.012322  0.001283  -0.000192  0.000851  0.000530  0.000236  0.000142  0.000357 
cumulative  5  0.00123  0.022782  0.010016  0.138867  0.262821  0.108775  0.055492  0.036301  0.003628  0.003333  0.003942  0.002828  0.001387  0.000908  0.003211 
periodic      0.003593  0.004626  0.128459  0.050898  0.028846  0.017801  0.013353  0.001674  -0.000569  0.000906  0.000587  0.000249  0.000147  0.000504 
cumulative  6  0.00094  0.026099  0.011032  0.106689  0.317039  0.133944  0.066194  0.041936  0.004178  0.002561  0.004756  0.003483  0.001655  0.001048  0.003698 
periodic      0.003317  0.004623  0.129227  0.051637  0.028862  0.017647  0.012598  0.001760  -0.000772  0.000813  0.000654  0.000268  0.000141  0.000487 
cumulative  7  0.00083  0.029309  0.011953  0.072741  0.354321  0.161875  0.077491  0.047751  0.004688  0.001746  0.005315  0.004209  0.001937  0.001194  0.004149 
periodic        0.003209  0.004607  0.128773  0.050739  0.028080  0.017886  0.013405  0.001735  -0.000815  0.000559  0.000726  0.000282  0.000145  0.000451 
 
Table 27. Simulation of decreasing forward probability rates (extreme value theory loss function as distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses 
on a cumulative and periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base. 
 
  
  iv 
 
 
      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002593  0.004588  0.104352  0.004135  0.000830  0.000157  0.000041  0.000001  0.002504  0.000062  0.000022  0.000004  0.000001  0.000001 
periodic      0.002593  0.004588  0.104352  0.004135  0.000830  0.000157  0.000041  0.000001  0.002504  0.000062  0.000022  0.000004  0.000001  0.000001 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005186  0.006491  0.206350  0.010987  0.002129  0.000389  0.000110  0.000001  0.004952  0.000165  0.000055  0.000010  0.000003  0.000001 
periodic      0.002593  0.001903  0.101998  0.006852  0.001299  0.000232  0.000069  0.000000  0.002448  0.000103  0.000034  0.000006  0.000002  0.000000 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007771  0.007921  0.304995  0.021439  0.004068  0.000683  0.000177  0.000002  0.007320  0.000322  0.000106  0.000017  0.000004  0.000002 
periodic      0.002585  0.001430  0.098645  0.010452  0.001939  0.000294  0.000067  0.000001  0.002367  0.000157  0.000050  0.000007  0.000002  0.000001 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010356  0.009126  0.399452  0.036819  0.006922  0.001108  0.000261  0.000003  0.009587  0.000552  0.000180  0.000028  0.000007  0.000003 
periodic      0.002585  0.001205  0.094457  0.015380  0.002854  0.000425  0.000084  0.000001  0.002267  0.000231  0.000074  0.000011  0.000002  0.000001 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012934  0.010181  0.488493  0.058068  0.010884  0.001691  0.000392  0.000004  0.011724  0.000871  0.000283  0.000042  0.000010  0.000004 
periodic      0.002578  0.001055  0.089041  0.021249  0.003962  0.000583  0.000131  0.000001  0.002137  0.000319  0.000103  0.000015  0.000003  0.000001 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015500  0.011127  0.570866  0.086047  0.016401  0.002502  0.000559  0.000006  0.013701  0.001291  0.000426  0.000063  0.000014  0.000005 
periodic      0.002566  0.000946  0.082373  0.027979  0.005517  0.000811  0.000167  0.000002  0.001977  0.000420  0.000143  0.000020  0.000004  0.000002 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018059  0.011991  0.645940  0.121363  0.023847  0.003575  0.000777  0.000008  0.015503  0.001820  0.000620  0.000089  0.000019  0.000007 
periodic        0.002559  0.000864  0.075074  0.035316  0.007446  0.001073  0.000218  0.000002  0.001802  0.000530  0.000194  0.000027  0.000005  0.000002 
 
Table 28. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and 
periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.  
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002593  0.004579  0.104369  0.004101  0.000831  0.000147  0.000039  0.000001  0.002505  0.000062  0.000022  0.000004  0.000001  0.000001 
periodic      0.002593  0.004579  0.104369  0.004101  0.000831  0.000147  0.000039  0.000001  0.002505  0.000062  0.000022  0.000004  0.000001  0.000001 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.006178  0.007552  0.241895  0.016947  0.003589  0.000685  0.000200  0.000004  0.005805  0.000254  0.000093  0.000017  0.000005  0.000004 
periodic      0.003585  0.002973  0.137526  0.012846  0.002758  0.000538  0.000161  0.000003  0.003301  0.000193  0.000072  0.000013  0.000004  0.000003 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.010451  0.010198  0.393470  0.045190  0.010055  0.001928  0.000516  0.000008  0.009443  0.000678  0.000261  0.000048  0.000013  0.000007 
periodic      0.004273  0.002646  0.151575  0.028243  0.006466  0.001243  0.000316  0.000004  0.003638  0.000424  0.000168  0.000031  0.000008  0.000004 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.015207  0.012650  0.542116  0.096050  0.023047  0.004522  0.001182  0.000016  0.013011  0.001441  0.000599  0.000113  0.000030  0.000014 
periodic      0.004756  0.002452  0.148646  0.050860  0.012992  0.002594  0.000666  0.000008  0.003568  0.000763  0.000338  0.000065  0.000017  0.000007 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.020238  0.014826  0.673930  0.172279  0.044946  0.009036  0.002325  0.000030  0.016174  0.002584  0.001169  0.000226  0.000058  0.000027 
periodic      0.005031  0.002176  0.131814  0.076229  0.021899  0.004514  0.001143  0.000014  0.003164  0.001143  0.000569  0.000113  0.000029  0.000012 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.025426  0.016816  0.780726  0.271508  0.078663  0.016656  0.004250  0.000054  0.018737  0.004073  0.002045  0.000416  0.000106  0.000048 
periodic      0.005188  0.001990  0.106796  0.099229  0.033717  0.007620  0.001925  0.000024  0.002563  0.001488  0.000877  0.000191  0.000048  0.000021 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.030681  0.018618  0.860469  0.386342  0.125166  0.028539  0.007366  0.000094  0.020651  0.005795  0.003254  0.000713  0.000184  0.000083 
periodic        0.005255  0.001802  0.079743  0.114834  0.046503  0.011883  0.003116  0.000040  0.001914  0.001723  0.001209  0.000297  0.000078  0.000035 
 
Table 29. Simulation of increasing forward probability rates (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and 
periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.  
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.005992  0.006269  0.241622  0.010208  0.001379  0.000144  0.000023  0.000000  0.005799  0.000153  0.000036  0.000004  0.000001  0.000000 
periodic      0.005992  0.006269  0.241622  0.010208  0.001379  0.000144  0.000023  0.000000  0.005799  0.000153  0.000036  0.000004  0.000001  0.000000 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.010961  0.008220  0.431596  0.032250  0.004144  0.000389  0.000061  0.000000  0.010358  0.000484  0.000108  0.000010  0.000002  0.000000 
periodic      0.004969  0.001951  0.189974  0.022042  0.002765  0.000245  0.000037  0.000000  0.004559  0.000331  0.000072  0.000006  0.000001  0.000000 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.015214  0.009431  0.580569  0.068669  0.008830  0.000719  0.000097  0.000001  0.013934  0.001030  0.000230  0.000018  0.000002  0.000000 
periodic      0.004253  0.001211  0.148973  0.036419  0.004686  0.000330  0.000037  0.000000  0.003575  0.000546  0.000122  0.000008  0.000001  0.000000 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.019060  0.010333  0.698890  0.121829  0.016286  0.001245  0.000147  0.000001  0.016773  0.001827  0.000423  0.000031  0.000004  0.000001 
periodic      0.003846  0.000902  0.118321  0.053160  0.007456  0.000526  0.000050  0.000000  0.002840  0.000797  0.000194  0.000013  0.000001  0.000000 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.022595  0.011046  0.790304  0.190679  0.027340  0.002020  0.000225  0.000001  0.018967  0.002860  0.000711  0.000051  0.000006  0.000001 
periodic      0.003535  0.000713  0.091414  0.068850  0.011054  0.000775  0.000078  0.000000  0.002194  0.001033  0.000287  0.000019  0.000002  0.000000 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.025819  0.011616  0.857477  0.270135  0.042336  0.003105  0.000323  0.000001  0.020579  0.004052  0.001101  0.000078  0.000008  0.000001 
periodic      0.003224  0.000570  0.067173  0.079456  0.014996  0.001085  0.000098  0.000000  0.001612  0.001192  0.000390  0.000027  0.000002  0.000000 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.028936  0.012125  0.907148  0.359962  0.062859  0.004687  0.000454  0.000002  0.021772  0.005399  0.001634  0.000117  0.000011  0.000002 
periodic        0.003117  0.000509  0.049671  0.089827  0.020523  0.001582  0.000131  0.000000  0.001192  0.001347  0.000534  0.000040  0.000003  0.000000 
 
Table 30. Simulation of decreasing forward probability rates (normal inverse distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and 
periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.  
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002569  0.004512  0.002851  0.000209  0.000004  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000068  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002569  0.004512  0.002851  0.000209  0.000004  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000068  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005176  0.006450  0.009512  0.000850  0.000021  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000228  0.000013  0.000001  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002607  0.001938  0.006661  0.000641  0.000017  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000160  0.000010  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007789  0.007924  0.021589  0.002135  0.000061  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000518  0.000032  0.000002  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002613  0.001474  0.012077  0.001285  0.000039  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000290  0.000019  0.000001  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010391  0.009154  0.039937  0.004462  0.000185  0.000002  0.000000  0.000000  0.000958  0.000067  0.000005  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002602  0.001230  0.018348  0.002327  0.000124  0.000002  0.000000  0.000000  0.000440  0.000035  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012955  0.010195  0.065128  0.008176  0.000377  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000  0.001563  0.000123  0.000010  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002564  0.001041  0.025191  0.003714  0.000192  0.000001  0.000000  0.000000  0.000605  0.000056  0.000005  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015510  0.011122  0.098164  0.013608  0.000714  0.000009  0.000000  0.000000  0.002356  0.000204  0.000019  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002555  0.000927  0.033036  0.005432  0.000337  0.000006  0.000000  0.000000  0.000793  0.000081  0.000009  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018078  0.011989  0.138913  0.021659  0.001298  0.000030  0.000000  0.000000  0.003334  0.000325  0.000034  0.000001  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic        0.002568  0.000867  0.040749  0.008051  0.000584  0.000021  0.000000  0.000000  0.000978  0.000121  0.000015  0.000001  0.000000  0.000000 
 
Table 31. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (beta distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic 
basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base. 
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      Expected and 
unexpected losses 
%k
j L  per tranche (in % of tranche volume)  %k
j L  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period) 
cum./per.  Yr  p   %k
j L   s %k
j L  
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100%  0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  0.002587  0.004581  0.105659  0.003039  0.000205  0.000010  0.000000  0.000000  0.002536  0.000046  0.000005  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002587  0.004581  0.105659  0.003039  0.000205  0.000010  0.000000  0.000000  0.002536  0.000046  0.000005  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  2  0.0026  0.005197  0.006476  0.209482  0.009744  0.000864  0.000017  0.000000  0.000000  0.005028  0.000146  0.000022  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002610  0.001895  0.103823  0.006705  0.000659  0.000007  0.000000  0.000000  0.002492  0.000101  0.000017  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  3  0.0026  0.007777  0.007932  0.308187  0.021358  0.002205  0.000091  0.000003  0.000000  0.007396  0.000320  0.000057  0.000002  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002580  0.001456  0.098705  0.011614  0.001341  0.000074  0.000003  0.000000  0.002369  0.000174  0.000035  0.000002  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  4  0.0026  0.010356  0.009115  0.402161  0.038983  0.004387  0.000225  0.000004  0.000000  0.009652  0.000585  0.000114  0.000006  0.000000  0.000000 
periodic      0.002579  0.001183  0.093974  0.017625  0.002182  0.000134  0.000001  0.000000  0.002255  0.000264  0.000057  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000 
cumulative  5  0.0026  0.012926  0.010175  0.489310  0.063951  0.008158  0.000425  0.000028  0.000000  0.011743  0.000959  0.000212  0.000011  0.000001  0.000000 
periodic      0.002570  0.001060  0.087149  0.024968  0.003771  0.000200  0.000023  0.000000  0.002092  0.000375  0.000098  0.000005  0.000001  0.000000 
cumulative  6  0.0026  0.015511  0.011120  0.569918  0.096979  0.013770  0.000770  0.000050  0.000000  0.013678  0.001455  0.000358  0.000019  0.000001  0.000000 
periodic      0.002585  0.000945  0.080608  0.033028  0.005612  0.000345  0.000022  0.000000  0.001935  0.000495  0.000146  0.000009  0.000001  0.000000 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.018083  0.011988  0.642122  0.138027  0.021825  0.001309  0.000076  0.000000  0.015411  0.002070  0.000567  0.000033  0.000002  0.000000 
periodic        0.002572  0.000868  0.072204  0.041048  0.008055  0.000539  0.000026  0.000000  0.001733  0.000616  0.000209  0.000013  0.000001  0.000000 
 
Table 32. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (negative binomial distribution of portfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and 
periodic basis – losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base. 
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      Unexpected 
divided by 
exp. losses 
s %
%
k
j
k
j L
 per tranche  
cum./per.  Yr  p   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.0026  4.399632  3.484512  36.702854  64.110433  107.346421  154.297022  339.564720 
periodic      4.399632  3.484512  36.702854  64.110433  107.346421  154.297022  339.564720 
cumulative  2  0.0026  3.785829  2.512960  23.265408  42.253033  73.920746  105.595136  218.906721 
periodic      3.342004  0.529687  14.141035  24.883264  44.217836  62.810301  126.092875 
cumulative  3  0.0026  3.360607  2.061186  16.776855  30.611230  57.157314  83.073508  164.836492 
periodic      0.777466  0.132350  9.572895  17.747653  32.184500  46.269872  76.006829 
cumulative  4  0.0026  2.448552  0.771988  12.812742  25.092041  46.815071  68.438096  139.493259 
periodic      0.543029  0.861934  7.114355  13.746811  26.005602  36.959719  72.514717 
cumulative  5  0.0026  2.240594  0.558457  10.093890  20.574793  39.571379  58.482570  120.385362 
periodic      0.406757  0.635773  5.504792  10.000140  20.124482  30.859098  59.478937 
cumulative  6  0.0026  2.080032  0.385690  8.110153  17.119327  34.366668  50.764189  108.229350 
periodic      0.275055  0.414983  4.350938  8.953731  17.715189  27.450049  53.932499 
cumulative  7  0.0026  0.955407  0.239034  6.612258  14.433535  30.053660  46.412161  97.979813 
periodic       0.204816  0.188537  3.477341  7.573891  15.306088  24.512671  45.450935 
 
Table 33.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for each tranche based on a simulation of constant forward probability rates 
(EVT distribution of portfolio losses) under loss recovery. 
 
 
      Unexpect. 
divided by 
exp. losses 
s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 per tranche  
cum./per.  Yr  ru   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.000100  4.399632  3.484512  36.702854  64.110433  107.346421  154.297022  339.564720 
periodic      4.399632  3.484512  36.702854  64.110433  107.346421  154.297022  339.564720 
cumulative  2  0.001231  3.785829  3.008487  27.899062  53.698372  96.028673  142.314033  309.612802 
periodic      3.342004  2.631317  36.040773  62.628416  108.570975  150.105864  310.453937 
cumulative  3  0.001945  3.360607  2.742849  19.011110  42.612144  85.086138  130.338390  296.099856 
periodic      2.745313  2.274788  35.020228  64.381490  118.428884  166.678943  327.366741 
cumulative  4  0.002469  3.103498  2.593312  10.667847  30.453772  70.725589  115.541203  275.345540 
periodic      2.543102  2.078119  34.438088  63.135083  113.080495  160.738280  342.453638 
cumulative  5  0.002771  2.940677  2.547467  6.581402  20.823275  57.330605  100.606003  250.379582 
periodic      2.453967  0.980200  33.777884  62.053598  108.465116  154.634826  320.261827 
cumulative  6  0.002954  2.830469  2.620724  3.605366  14.311552  44.712487  85.759867  228.695160 
periodic      2.405616  0.924590  33.707930  60.077412  107.721293  152.896657  315.453997 
cumulative  7  0.003055  2.730647  2.850588  2.120712  8.878558  33.871663  72.070196  203.054503 
periodic       2.254745  0.893580  33.587668  60.130860  110.574107  160.709078  292.119219 
 
Table 34.  k
j
k
j L L s % % ratio for each tranche based on a simulation of increasing forward probability rates of a 
deteriorating portfolio (EVT distribution of portfolio losses) under loss recovery. 
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      Unexpect. 
divided by 
exp. losses 
s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 per tranche  
cum./per.  Yr  ru   s %
%
k
j L
k
j L
 
0-2.4%  2.4-3.9%  3.9-6.5%  6.5-9%  9-10.5%  10.5-100% 
cumulative  1  0.003673  2.153361  0.741965  32.466114  60.125725  106.827696  154.702873  423.910819 
periodic      2.153361  0.741965  32.466114  60.125725  106.827696  154.702873  423.910819 
cumulative  2  0.002669  2.285866  0.883944  19.592067  43.464264  89.692804  133.882010  330.185942 
periodic      2.444718  2.014072  33.557040  60.160123  110.069756  156.969883  309.835719 
cumulative  3  0.001945  2.414625  2.032232  12.006405  32.504371  74.704197  118.949257  298.438110 
periodic      2.745313  2.274788  35.020228  64.381490  118.428884  166.678943  327.366741 
cumulative  4  0.001538  2.536279  2.189857  7.517381  24.328460  60.236739  105.061912  263.940601 
periodic      3.014149  2.465404  35.278269  62.591515  110.587890  162.502512  217.243193 
cumulative  5  0.001231  2.663346  2.374104  4.901839  18.352531  50.257479  93.544953  244.403871 
periodic      3.342004  2.631317  36.040773  62.628416  108.570975  150.105864  310.453937 
cumulative  6  0.000940  2.779611  2.602486  3.448034  13.903233  42.879270  83.164265  233.096603 
periodic      3.578179  2.818469  35.740968  62.066461  108.224317  159.543795  390.565240 
cumulative  7  0.000834  2.877246  2.871633  2.600252  10.522826  36.134792  74.716369  223.428582 
periodic       3.671349  2.884306  36.276896  63.734063  109.384782  153.243456  350.959123 
 
Table 35.  k
j
k
j L L s % %  ratio for each tranche based on a simulation of decreasing forward probability rates of 
an improving portfolio (EVT distribution of portfolio losses) under loss recovery.  
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16  APPENDIX II: FIGURES 
    
 
Figure A1. Term structure of cumulative expected losses in various tranches of a collateral portfolio (extreme 
value simulation), depicted on a linear and a logarithmic scale. In the linear version of the loss cascades the first 
tranche [0-2.4%] scales with the right axis. 
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Figure A2. Term structure of periodic expected losses in various tranches of a collateral portfolio (extreme 
value simulation), depicted on a linear and a logarithmic scale. In the linear version of the loss cascades the first 
tranche [0-2.4%] scales with the right axis. 
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Figure A3. Term structure of cumulative expected losses in various tranches of a collateral portfolio (normal 
inverse distribution), depicted on a linear and a logarithmic scale. In the linear version of the loss cascades the 
first tranche [0-2.4%] scales with the right axis. The most senior tranche has been excluded for the logarithmic 
case due to negative values. 
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Figure A4. Term structure of periodic expected losses in various tranches of a collateral portfolio (normal 
inverse distribution), depicted on a linear and a logarithmic scale. In the linear version of the loss cascades the 
first tranche [0-2.4%] scales with the right axis. The most senior tranche has been excluded for the logarithmic 
case due to negative values. 
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Figure A5. Expected loss in tranches for a deteriorating (increasing forward rate of default) portfolio given an 
underlying extreme value distribution, where the first loss position [0-2.4%] is scaled to the right axis. 
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Figure A6. Expected loss in tranches for an improving (decreasing forward rate of default) portfolio given an 
underlying extreme value distribution, where the first loss position [0-2.4%] is scaled to the right axis. 
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Figure A7. Expected loss in tranches for a deteriorating (increasing forward rate of default) portfolio given an 
underlying normal inverse distribution, where the first loss position [0-2.4%] is scaled to the right axis. 
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Figure A8. Term structure of the s % %
k
j
k
j L L  ratio for all tranches of the collateral portfolio on the basis of 
uniform default characteristics of tranches (EVT) for a decreasing forward rate of default (cumulative and 
periodic loss). 
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Figure A9. Term structure of the s % %
k
j
k
j L L  ratio for the entire collateral portfolio on the basis of uniform 
default characteristics of tranches (on the basis of EVT and NID loss functions) for a constant, increasing and 
decreasing forward rate of default (cumulative and periodic loss). 
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Figure A10. Term structure of expected losses in the senior “investor tranches” [3.9-6.5%] and [6.5-9%] at 
a constant forward rate of default of p=0.0026 on the basis of an extreme value theory loss function compared 
with corporate zero-coupon bonds. 
Term Structure of CLO Tranche 6.5-9% 
(compared with bond default rates)
0.00000
0.00050
0.00100
0.00150
0.00200
0.00250
0.00300
0.00350
0.00400
0.00450
0.00500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Periods
1
/
1
0
0
 
%
6.5-9% (EVT_const)
A+/A1 (not matched)
BBB/Baa2 (7th period matched)
Term Structure of CLO Tranche 3.9-6.5% 
(compared with bond default rates)
0.00000
0.00200
0.00400
0.00600
0.00800
0.01000
0.01200
0.01400
0.01600
0.01800
0.02000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Periods
1
/
1
0
0
 
%
3.9-6.5% (EVT_const)
A-/A3 (not matched)
BBB/Baa2 (7th period matched) 
  xxi 
 
 
Figure A11. Term structure of expected losses in the most junior “investor tranche” [2.4-3.9%] and the first 
loss position ([0-2.4%] tranche) at a constant forward rate of default of p=0.0026 on the basis of an extreme 
value theory loss function compared with corporate zero-coupon bonds. 
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Figure A12. Comparison of the term structures of expected losses on the basis of the q-q-plot for the 
simulation of portfolio losses and subsequent loss cascading on the basis of a normal inverse distribution and an 
extreme value theory loss function. 
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Figure A13. Relationship between estimated and unexpected losses (per period) on an EVT loss function of 
credit default  
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